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Abstract  
China’s recent reinvigorated relations with African countries over the past two decades have been 
one of the most significant developments in the region. The idea of marginalization appears to be 
contradicted with the recent upsurge of political and economic investments directed towards Afri-
can countries. The Sino-African relationship is part of a recently more active foreign policy and 
international strategy of China based on the increasingly developing multipolarity. Developments of 
increased and alternative development assistance, debt cancellation and a boom in bilateral trade 
with a strategic Chinese focus on raw materials to sustain their future economic growth, have prov-
en to be mutually advantageous. China presents an attractive alternative to the traditional unilateral 
development assistance posed by the US and the West. China has done so by implementing such 
alternative initiatives and in the meantime gained valuable diplomatic support to defend its interna-
tional interests. Though these developments of economic and political nature cannot exist without 
having consequences for the interstate system and have been accompanied by changes to the geopo-
litical landscape. For one, China’s alternative development assistance is based on the “Five Princi-
ples of Co-Existence”, making China able to engage with authoritarian governments and otherwise 
considered as rouge states. This relationship is therefore at times of the expense of human rights 
making the economic involvement and developments mixed at best. However, the increasing rela-
tionship have been institutionalized by the creation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
thereby creating the incentive for further cooperation and sharing of expertise. This has in some 
instances meant African states are starting to emulate the Chinese model for development. This de-
velopment raises the question of, what political consequences does this increase in relations be-
tween Africa and China actually have?  
This project investigates that question by setting these developments into perspective with the theo-
retical framework of Modern System Theory developed by Giovanni Arrighi. By portraying the 
financial expansion in Africa and the development of foreign markets, while sustaining their eco-
nomic growth, we argue the engagement and commitments in Africa are similar to that of previous 
hegemonies. Due to the processes we analyse, we argue that China may become the next hegemon 
in the interstate system. In our investigation we have greater emphasis on how in relation to the pro-
cesses of the theory instead of the why and when. During the analysis and the following discussion 
we conclude that the tendencies that China is portraying in the interstate system is towards hegemo-
ny, but it will only sustain if the present developments are without interruptions. 
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Introduction 
One of the single most debated subjects in the beginning of the 21st century has been the China’s 
rise to prominence in the world. China is a controversial subject, because of its alien characteristics 
compared to Western countries. China’s population is the largest in the world, its economy has been 
growing annually 10 % on average since 1978 and its political statements and actions have claimed 
international critique. But as the Middle Kingdom once again is increasingly drawing focus on its 
many achievements, building political partnerships around the world and becoming the single big-
gest economic driver for global growth, China is in the process of expansion. All this is done, while 
the Western world is faced with economic recession, financial crises and unsuccessful wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, which were supposed to reassert Western hegemony (Arrighi, 2007: 179). As of 
now, the world is dominated by mostly Western-led international institutions, such as the United 
Nations’ Security Council, the IMF, WTO and the World Bank. How will China with its immense 
size, self-confidence and its quest for recognition as a Great Power, fit into this Western-dominated 
world? 
Furthermore, China’s increasing engagement with the developing world has been subject to interna-
tional controversy, especially China’s engagement with the Sudanese government in Khartoum. The 
developing world, Africa in particular, has in return welcomed China as a business partner and po-
litical supporter. African countries are increasingly choosing to collaborate with China instead of 
being subject to pre-conditioned agreements on reforms and liberalization promoted by IMF, the 
World Bank and the West. As China and Africa are becoming more intimate, the trade has greatly 
benefitted both entities. As China is seeking to sustain its economic growth, its dependency of raw 
materials and energy sources are becoming apparent. African countries are willing to trade with 
China for capital, long-term investments and equal political recognition. Furthermore, China has 
eclipsed the US position of Africa’s biggest trading partner in 2009, hinting at China’s increasing 
engagement with Africa (The Wall Street Journal, 05-11-2013). So the question at hand is, how is 
China supporting its quest for Great Power status by getting involved in the African continent? 
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Problem Area 
In the following section we will argue, first, why we can justify investigating China in a condition 
of increasing multi-polarity and, second, how their development relates to their increasing relations 
with African countries. 
Why China matters in a condition of increasing multi-polarity  
This decline of US power and the end of unquestioned hegemony raises several questions, yet one 
takes a more predominant role than any of the others: Who, if any, are to follow in the footsteps of 
the US? As of now the world economy is undergoing a relatively steady shift in economic and polit-
ical power, with the emergence of states like Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) 
as the new poles of global economic growth, trade and investments. The ascension of these new 
regional powers has changed the international political and economic landscape, but China excep-
tion in comparison with Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa. China is superior in a wide range of 
factors, such as economic capabilities, size of population and military capabilities (Carmody, 2013: 
137). 
China is in the process of significant development and is becoming more assertive by the day. Re-
cent examples include the creation of the new ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone) that has re-
sulted in further tensions about contested territories with South Korea and Japan (Beech, 2013: 14). 
Since the opening of China’s economic markets by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China’s economy has 
quadrupled in size. China’s economy may even double again and become on par with the United 
States in 2020 and furthermore become the world’s largest economy in 2050 (Jacques 2009: 366, 
Geeraerts 2011: 58). While China has been growing rapidly with an annual 10 % growth in GDP 
since 1978, the US has been occupied with the War on Terror since 9/11. The US has also been 
struggling with a stagnated economy and low figures on economic growth, allowing China to take 
advantage of a weak global hegemon (Rothberg 2008: 1). This and other factors have led to several 
developments, one of the most significant is the achievement of lifting more than 80 % of China’s 
extreme poor people out into better economic circumstances (Jacques 2009: 162). China’s econom-
ic growth is however rather dependent on American and European markets for export of Chinese 
goods to sustain a continuous prosperity combined with China’s ability to continuously produce 
cheaper. Despite the current financial crisis, China’s ability to sustain a stable economic growth and 
not decline under 6% GDP is greatly credited by two major trends. First, by having great global 
competitiveness in manufacturing costs, second, their home markets’ growing ability to buy manu-
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factured goods because of a general growth in income in the cities. (Jacques 2009: 163, Arrighi 
2007: 4). As a result, China has increasingly consolidated themselves as the de facto centre of 
growth in the Asian region and for that reason, China is drawing in other Asian countries economic 
agreements (Jacques 2009: 318). It is arguable that China has created an alternative model for eco-
nomic development, and thus, becoming an inspiration for other states. Furthermore, the rapid 
growth and competitiveness of China has also transpired into diplomatic agreements and economic 
trade expansions into East Asia, Central Asia, Latin America and Africa, therefore extending into 
more markets than the previously predominant American and European markets and increasing 
their economic flexibility and stability. Beijing is becoming, if not already, the head of the world’s 
most successful economy and will undoubtedly become more influential in matters of global gov-
ernance (Shen 2009: 33). As evident, China is taking a more predominant role in various interna-
tional organizations and increasing their diplomatic ties across the globe, as well as creating new 
ways of governance to better influence international matters in their own national interests and 
norms (Geeraerts 2011: 57). However, China is not only growing in matters of economy or political 
influence, but also increasing their spheres of interest with military ambitions. In 2008 China be-
came the world’s second highest military spender (Ibid.: 58). As their economic interest are expand-
ing rapidly and becoming increasingly dependent on foreign trade, so has the pressure to take 
preemptive measures as to safeguard such trade routes more proactively. Therefore China’s military 
capabilities are shifting their focus on defending their sovereignty, to be able to take necessary ac-
tions to secure its interest overseas (Ibid.: 58).  
“Japan was but the harbinger of an Asian future. The country has proved too 
small and inward-looking to transform the world. What follows it – China, above 
all – will prove neither ... Europe was the past, the US is the present and a China-
dominated Asia [is] the future of the global economy” (Arrighi 2007: 2) 
We perceive these developments to be of such an immense character that the current international 
order will struggle to adjust to. China’s significant achievements and continued growth show a big 
potential of an emerging world power that might rival that of the US. We are not so much interested 
into looking what and how a possible confrontation with the US would be shaped. We are more 
interested in how China is straining the current international order and what implications the devel-
opment up until now this development has had.  
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China in Africa: A partnership for mutual development  
Africa has gone from relying on foreign aid to a more self-sufficient and self-developing region, 
and in the same turn changing the perception of Africa from being the “hopeless continent” to a 
“rising power”. Today Africa is being considered as the next major growth pole in the world econ-
omy, which has attracted great global attention. Additionally Sub-Saharan African economies are 
projected to grow by 6,2% GDP in 2013, compared to 1,4% GDP for advanced economies and 
5,3% for emerging and developing economies. Moreover, the top seven fastest growing economies 
in the world between 2011 and 2015 will be African countries (The Economist, 29-11-2013)  
Reflecting China’s growing engagement in Africa’s, there is a general tendency the BRICS seem to 
gather attention in Africa. On the one hand, the BRICS seek to gain access to the growing markets 
and untapped resources African countries appear to offer. On the other hand, the BRICS also seek 
to establish their own Great Power status alongside the current Great Powers – the UK, US and 
France (Vickers 2013: 673). In this pursuit, China stands out as the state with the biggest capabili-
ties and commitments, which we perceive as part of their motivation of engaging with the African 
countries (Ibid.: 673).  
This courtship and the increasing dependency upon each other are more explicit between Africa and 
China than any other state with engagements in Africa. The attraction of Africa for China is rather 
simple, as China needs a vast range of raw materials to fuel their economic growth, as well as Afri-
ca is interested in the capital, China has to offer (Rothberg 2008: 1; Jacques 2009: 321). As China – 
in contrast to Africa - is poor endowed with natural resources such as common metals, oil and natu-
ral gas, which partly explains China’s natural interest in Africa (Jacques 2009: 168). The Sino-
African relationship also has a long-term goal, as China is initiating great infrastructure projects to 
help African states become more sustainable and offers better access to African markets for Chinese 
goods. One deeper development we will focus on, is the Chinese Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) 
in Africa, which in recent years this has increased more than five times over in the time period of 
2002 to 2008. Earlier, European states accounted for half of the amount of FDI in Africa, while 
China only totaled 10 %. Now, almost two decades later, there has been a massive increase in bilat-
eral trade agreements, common development goals and improvement of international relations. The 
Chinese investments have more than doubled, while the European’s relative share of FDI in Africa 
has dropped below 25% (Ibid.: 325). Another example of the increasing relationship and dependen-
cy can be found in Africa and China’s imports and exports. About 40% of Africa’s total exports to 
Asia, go to China, while about 30% of Asia’s total exports to Africa comes from China (Rothberg 
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2008: 4). This relationship is both economic and political in its nature and has greatly intensified the 
last two decades. The Sino-African trade relationship has become institutionalized with the creation 
of Forum of China African Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 that involves more than 40 member 
states with the focus on improving trade and political relations (Jacques 2009: 325). This move con-
firms the increasing Chinese engagement in Africa and China’s perceived value of this relationship, 
which needs further investigation.   
However, the assumptions and views of international scholars are plenty in relation to Chinas rise 
and can be interpreted in different ways. It is however a fact, that China has expanded in economic 
and political relations, and especially in Africa. What is interesting to examine is what exactly such 
developments entail and what such consequences might mean for international society.  
”... there is no consensus on what kind of world order, if any, we can expect to 
emerge from the combination of whatever changes are actually occurring in the 
global configuration of power” (Arrighi et al. 1999: 21) 
Problem statement 
How does the economic, political and military engagement in Africa support China’s development 
into a potential hegemon in the interstate system and what does this imply in relations to the exist-
ing world order dominated by the US hegemony? 
Literature review and research hypotheses 
There exists a substantial amount of literature regarding China’s rise as an economic and political 
power. These are mainly divided up into two groups: The more moderate group, arguing for a pos-
sible peaceful rise of China inside the current world system without the necessity of a political or 
military ultimate confrontation (Rothberg, 2008; Alden et al., 2009; Taylor, 2009). On the other 
side there exists the confrontational camp, arguing there is no room for a new rising power without 
it conflicting with the current US dominance (Mearsheimer, 2004; 2006; 2010). However this field 
of Sino-African relations have until recently been a part of China’s relationship with the Third 
World and therefore this research area is emerging. “Research of African and Chinese politics and 
foreign relations has in the main proceeded without serious overlap and cross-fertilization until 
relatively recently (Alden et al., 2009: 372-373)”.  
This project is concerned with the growing importance of Sino-African relations and the perception 
of a possible peaceful rise of China. However this group of scholars do not go too much in depth 
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about a new world order containing both China and the US as the dominant actors. Mearsheimer 
(2004, 2006, 2010) does put China up against the US but in an offensive realist theoretical frame-
work. Mearsheimer’s theoretical works are characterized by the deterministic nature of the applica-
tion of the zero-sum game to power relations, which we disagree with. The main reasons are we 
perceive structures both being enabling and constraining, but never deterministic as in the case of 
Mearsheimer. Applying Mearsheimer to a Cold War context, the only possible outcome would have 
been global war, but this was not the case. Also the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops in sev-
eral instances has contradicted Mearsheimer’s theory, where direct warfare has been prevented. We 
are more concerned about the cyclic nature of the international order as formulated by Wallerstein 
(2004) and Arrighi (1999, 2007). In contrast to Mearsheimer, Wallerstein and Arrighi offer a more 
flexible interpretation of international relations with more possible explanations than just the ‘bal-
ance of power’ with the constraining zero-sum game underpinning all international actions. As we 
will describe later in this project, our theory is more open towards different actions made by nation-
states and we use it to apply a more investigative aspect towards the research in international rela-
tions. We find a World System analysis of the emerging hegemonic status of China with the analyt-
ical point of departure in the Sino-African relations lacking in the current literature, which we aim 
to contribute to. What our project seeks answer, is the question of China possibly can fit into the 
existing world order as described by Wallerstein and Arrighi, and how this is done in the interna-
tional system.  
In order to properly answer our research question, we analyse the economic, political and military 
aspects individually followed by a collective discussion of all three aspects. The discussion will 
lead to an assessment of China can fit into the existing world order or not. It is our conviction that 
we are seeing a shift in political, military and economic terms in the current international world 
order, mainly spearheaded by the People’s Republic of China. The rise of China should also be seen 
in the light of China’s characteristics differ on many subjects in relation to the current US-
dominated world order, which impels us as students of international relations to seek to understand 
the potentials of friction of accommodating such an immense nation as China in a system with val-
ues incoherent to the existing code of conduct and norms. While we do not see China as a rogue-
player in international relations, we do recognize that China is driven by other values than those 
currently dominating in the world system. We therefore find it necessary to look at three different 
aspects of this hypothesis: At an economic level, political level with an incorporated level of mili-
tary capabilities and an overall systematic level. These hypotheses focus on China’s economic de-
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velopment with point of departure in Africa, the political rise of China as a regional power and how 
the political and economic power is being manifested in China’s increasing military capabilities. 
We have formulated three hypotheses that our analyses will seek to either verify or disclaim. 
1. China’s growing level of economic investments in Africa is an international trend support-
ing its emergence as a dominant global actor. 
2. Through the application of Zhou Enlai’s “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence”, bilat-
eral agreements and regional organisations, China is practicing an alternative approach to in-
ternational relations and other countries.  
3. China’s increased commitment to protection of the Sea Lines of Communication primarily 
around the Gulf of Aden is part of the increase in China’s military capabilities and emer-
gence as a new hegemon. 
Delimitations of the project 
Domestic policy 
We will delimitate us from going into depth with domestic policies of countries. We do of course 
recognize the potential influence domestic policy might impact on the conduct of foreign policies. 
We see domestic policy as generally detached from the conduct of foreign policy, as we assume the 
conduct of foreign policy happens in an anarchistic world. This is differentiated from the domestic 
policy as there are organizations that are able to police the populace, but that is not the case in inter-
national relations. The delimitation is not entirely strict in the sense, as in some instances it is nec-
essary to draw upon certain points regarding domestic policies in order to explain the conduct of a 
specific foreign policy. We will only do so in order to support the analyses’ focus on foreign poli-
cies – economic, political and system-level.  
State-owned enterprises (SOE’s) 
During this project, we have treated Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE’s) as an extension of the 
Chinese political apparatus. The SOE’s are in large extents under control of the Communist Party of 
China (CPC). This entails certain edicts issued by the CPC that the SOE’s are forced to follow in 
order to further China’s foreign policy because of the make-up of the executive boards of the Chi-
nese SOE’s (Taylor, 2009: 5). There are several cases in the literature where Chinese SOE’s act on 
their own due to the capitalist market the SOE’s are operating in. In certain cases there has even 
been disregard to CPC-edicts, however we will not go into depth with this as the SOE’s are acting 
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out of a pure profit-driven motive rather than out of spite with the CPC. The effects of Chinese 
SOE’s profit-driven actions do not change the conduct of China’s foreign policy. Therefore we see 
Chinese SOE’s as potential instruments to conduct foreign policy by the CPC in the world.   
States as entities 
We treat nation-states and SOE’s as unitary entities in the regard that we focus on the actions and 
statements done by the respective nation-states and relevant actors. We do not go into depth with 
the discussions and debates regarding the possible conduct of policies, due to two factors: First, the 
access to the internal discussions of China’s cabinet are not widely accessible; it would lead to 
guesswork, if we were to examine the Chinese cabinet’s internal affairs. In order to affirm facts, it 
will inhibit the reliability of this project if it was based on guesswork. Further, China is practicing 
active censorship, meaning official information originating from the cabinet might have been edit-
ed, therefore it is better to apply a deductive approach in analysing China’s actions and then inter-
pret the motives behind China’s overall perspective. Second, the decisions behind the actions taken 
by the respective nation-states’ governments have been decided upon, and therefore represents a 
more or less agreed consensus behind the conduct of policy. This enables us to perceive the gov-
ernments as single actors operating in an international environment. 
Timeframe 
In the process of our research, we have set a timeframe wherein our main research will be conduct-
ed, from the 4th of June, 1989 – the June Fourth Incident – to the current date. The June Fourth Inci-
dent – also known as the Tiananmen Square Massacre – sparked vast international and especially 
Western critique of the handling of the protests by the Chinese authorities. The Chinese-African 
relationship was however reinvigorated by the June Fourth Incident, because of either the support or 
silent support directed by African states towards Beijing shortly after the incident, despite the gen-
eral critique of the CPC (Rothberg, 2008, Alden et al., 2009, Taylor, 2009). This delimitation also 
underpins our conviction that due to the USSR starting to fragment with the beginning of the revo-
lutions in Eastern Europe, the US-dominated hegemony of the world was seemingly further consol-
idated. 4th of June therefore marks our timeframe of interest in which we conduct our research, 
however we do draw upon certain events before the 4th of June, 1989, but this will only happen in 
order to support of our main research. 
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Conceptual clarification  
This chapter explains the different terms in detail, as to give the necessary understanding of its use 
and in context.  
Actor: An actor is defined as an independent organization such as an NGO or a state. In this project, 
we’re using the term, actor, in relation to the before mentioned in regards to certain topics of rele-
vance, where they can be heard in either an arena or different forums.  
Agency: An agency is a combination of states that have combined towards a greater purpose.  
Cashbox: A relative large accumulation of mobile capital (Arrighi et al. 1999: 42-44).  
FDI/OFDI: Foreign Direct Investment or Outgoing Foreign Direct Investment is that of either state 
or enterprise that invest in specific areas interest, this may be interpreted as infrastructure projects.  
Bifurcation: Is the term which is used as either a prelude to chaos or under the influence of chaos. 
This means that the hegemon won’t be able to control the processes of the interstate system, thus 
solutions to a given problem will be addressed by the rival powers and not the hegemon itself 
(Arrighi et al. 1999: 21) 
Geopolitics: The geographical distribution of power among the units in the interstate system which 
transcends across the world.   
Hegemon: Hegemony is the condition of global governance, thus the dominating unit of the inter-
state system becomes primus inter pares, meaning that when the interstate rivalry becomes so un-
balanced that a unit can impose its will, rules and wishes on every state without the need of argu-
mentation or resistance (Wallerstein 1984: 38-39).   
Interstate system: With the notion of the interstate system we refer to the system as explained by 
Giovanni Arrighi which portrays sovereign states as unit states (Arrighi et al. 1999: 22).  
Statecraft: Statecraft refers to the functions of state officials and their role concerning international 
politics as well as the realistic principles of the unit state (Sørensen et al. 2007: 74). 
State/Country: Defined of its sovereignty of a specific geographical area and its population. States 
or countries are also what is referred to as units of the interstate system, but both units and 
states/countries will be used synonymous through the project.  
Systematic chaos: A condition of irreversible processes of the interstate system. 
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Systematic problem: A problem that influences and interferes with different spheres of the majority 
within the interstate system. 
Phase of transition: A variable condition that implements processes of transition of hegemonic 
power, whereas such transition happens on the premise of global power changes.   
17 
 
Methodology 
Methodology outlines the criteria for acquiring academic knowledge in our project, by stating some 
of the most fundamental prepositions and thereby extending into specific choices and limitations of 
the empirical data. 
Purpose of Research 
The purpose of this project is to analyze the current developments of the increasing relations be-
tween China and Africa. Our aim is to analyze the financial, political and military development in 
the Sino-African relationship. We apply Giovanni Arrighi’s Modern World Theory deductively by 
using the theory as our frame, thereby guiding the research and distinguishing the different trends, 
patterns and features in the interstate system. Later, we will discuss why we believe Giovanni 
Arrighi’s Modern World Theory is better in describing the current developments. After our analy-
sis, it is followed by a discussion of the trends we have uncovered. The discussion will be con-
cerned about the likely future consequences for the interstate system. According to Arrighi, if an 
analysis yields sufficient insight and understanding of the different processes that are involved, it 
gives room for the controversial endeavor to discuss the trends. Furthermore, if the analysis’ results 
are relative reliable, Arrighi’s theory offers room for cautious predictions what future implications 
such developments might have (Arrighi et al. 1999: 21). Therefore, by identifying and analyzing the 
features that are important for current developments of commerce, politics and military in relation 
to Modern World Theory, we are able to argue for a possible direction with the continuation of the 
uncovered trends. The importance of being able to make an overview of possible future trends is 
undeniable. Policymakers in various countries could benefit from this in future policy-makings and 
scholarly this project could yield information on the long-term goals of China, which traditionally 
offers little to none information on the deliberations on their policies and future goals. Thus the aim 
of this project is dual, in the sense that we analyze the past and current developments in order to 
understand and assess possible future implications.  
In the investigation of political, economic and military features, we add the notion of correlating 
trends we identify alongside the analyses. By trend we indicate a broad tendency whereas, we can 
determine how established actually are, and thereby assessing the future perspective of these devel-
opments. However, it is important to note, that the theory in itself indicates a continuously system 
of actions, but each phase or transition may be influenced by a several of different processes that 
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may or may not have important consequences. It is therefore our interpretation of the subject that is 
at hand and not the theory itself.  
Philosophy of science – the ontology and epistemological premise of the research  
In this project our theoretical understanding is framed by a critical realist philosophy of science as 
described by Buch-Hansen & Nielsen (2012). First we will shortly describe the critical realism as a 
philosophy of science and relate it specifically to examination of our subject. Secondly we will dis-
cuss critical realism’s methodological implication and limitations for our examination of the Sino-
African relationship. Lastly we would look into what critical theory could have contributed to our 
research project, should it have been our chosen philosophy of science.  
Critical realism is characterized by an ontological realist and epistemological relativistic approach 
as a philosophy of science. Critical realism’s ontological realist views the reality in three domains; a 
differentiated, open and deep domain. The differentiated domain relates that reality consists of ob-
jects with different causal potentials, while the open domain relates that the reality is an open sys-
tem, in which there are no empirical laws. Instead reality is made of possibilities and it is not possi-
ble to predict future, but only explaining the current and past events. However it is possible to make 
qualified suggestions about likely future development (Bhaskar, 1997: 50). Furthermore the reality 
also contains a deep domain that is not directly examinable. It is this specific domain we are aiming 
at with our application of Arrighi’s theory, as we seek to uncover the causal and generative mecha-
nisms of this domain. The epistemological approach relates that knowledge is a social product and 
is built upon by subjective perceptions of history. Knowledge is per se not objective or secure; ra-
ther it is open to re-interpretation and re-articulation. Therefore it is necessary to adopt a critical 
view upon already gained knowledge, as is might be flawed or even wrong (Buch-Hansen & Niel-
sen, 2012: 286-287).  
The ontological realistic part of this project is manifested in our work through our perception of 
apparent and factual events to which we direct our analysis, to gain further knowledge about pro-
cesses on deeper levels. This serves as a point of departure to clarify which causal potentials and 
generative mechanisms drive the current shift in political, economic and military influence from the 
US to China on a global and African scale. We apply critical realism in the way we have selected 
our analysis objects as they are tangible and observable and open to analysis. However we aim our 
analysis in order to uncover the causalities in order to explain for example what has been the drive 
between the increasing intensification of the Sino-African relationship. It is the structures and 
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mechanisms in this deep domain that are our main goal is to uncover and determine their im-
portance in the shift of political, military and economic influence (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen, 2012.: 
281-284). However we do of course recognize the fallibility of the empirical knowledge we build 
our project upon and that it is knowledge originating from a certain scientific frame, as the world 
according to critical realism is multi-causal and multi-dimensional (Ibid.: 283).  
In choosing critical realism as our philosophy of science, this of course entails certain methodologi-
cal implications for our project. As Buch-Hansen & Nielsen writes, certain methods correspond 
better in the tradition of critical realism. We apply abstraction through our delimitations by not 
looking into certain factors, such as domestic policies, grass-root movement, etc. Abstraction is a 
method of disregarding certain elements in reality in order to better examine the structures or cau-
salities in the deep domain and go beyond simple descriptive analyses (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen, 
2012: 304-306). Furthermore following our abstraction, Arrighi’s World Systems Theory will also 
be critically reasserted in terms of its explanatory power in relation to the deep domain. We will 
explain later how the philosophy of science relates to the theory described by Arrighi.  
  
20 
 
Methods 
In this part we will first give an overview of how we apply a deductive approach to the Sino-
African relationship. We will briefly describe its implications for our project and the project design. 
Secondly we will describe our research design and our application of a mixed methods approach to 
our subject. Third, we will describe the interdisciplinarity of our research.  
A deductive approach 
Our research employs a deductive approach which we base upon the large amount of literature 
found on the subjects of world hegemony, Sino-African relations, economic power, trade relations, 
the rise of China, and industrialization (Rothberg, 2008; Alden, 2009; Taylor, 2009). This also im-
plies the data chosen in our project is based on the specific focus of Arrighi’s theory. This enables 
us to draw upon well-established knowledge in order to guide our further (Bryman, 2012:24-27). 
We will later in this project make a literature review as well as critique of our sources and data. 
Nevertheless, in choosing this approach means the Modern World Theory determines our level of 
analysis, identifies the relevant objects of analysis and guides our collection of. This approach ena-
bles us to test our empirical data vis-à-vis our theory and assumptions. In doing so, we define our 
assumptions in researchable units, as to operationalize the collection of data in correlation with the 
concepts wherein our assumptions originated. This indicates the implemented theory constitutes a 
methodical framework for collection of data and enables us to use such data in our analytical de-
signs to process to empirical data. It is worth noting, that the choice of theory will inevitable shape 
our collection of data. Another consideration is the fact, that even now that we claim the project to 
be deductive, we will unavoidably be influenced by processes of the inductive approach, due to new 
revelations when research is carried out in practice and not a product of thought (Bryman 2012: 27). 
In sum, the aim of the project is not to evaluate and modify the theory of Modern World Theory, 
but to use the theory in correlation of the deductive approach as a framework to explain the current 
developments that are appearing.  
Research Design 
During the work with this project, we have adopted a mixed methods approach to our empirical 
work. This is due to the fact, that on one side we have been able to cover much more and different 
literature in our research and on the other side due to our personal conviction, that in order to peel 
off the different layers of reality due to our work rooted in the critical realism, it is necessary to ap-
proach it from different angles in order to reveal the whole picture (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen, 2012: 
21 
 
281-291). The research of the project will focus primarily analyses on secondary sources, because 
of the large amount of data and knowledge in the field. The project in itself will contribute to the 
small but emerging field of Sino-African relations. 
We do of course recognize that the quantitative and qualitative originates from different paradigms 
of social research, but that in today’s actual context; this argument is no longer viable, because the 
project is rooted in a cross-disciplinary research (Bryman, 2012: 629-630). Also in order to support 
the projects critical realist approach to the research regarding the problem statement and our hy-
pothesis, it was more rewarding working with this mixed methods approach which gave a more 
broad perspective of the field of research.  
Furthermore the figure below illustrates the design of our project report and key-points throughout 
the report. 
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Illustration 1: An illustrated general overview of the of the structure of the project   
Problem statement and research hypothesisis 
Philosophy of science 
Presentation of critical realism’s contribution  
Methods 
Application of a deductive approach and mixed meth-
ods research, literature review and critique on sources 
Theory 
Presentation of Giovanni Arrighi’s Modern World The-
ory  
Analysis 
An economic, political and military analysis of the 
emergence of China as a new potential hegemon on the 
basis of the increasing Sino-African relationship. 
Discussion and conclusion  
Discussion as well as an assessment of the results in 
relation to Arrighi’s theory and a conclusion on the 
hypothesis 
Epilogue  
Empirical data 
A review of our data and empirical sources 
23 
 
Mixed Methods Research 
This section will cover the subjects of data collection and data analysis in relation to the approach 
of mixed methods research as described by Alan Bryman (2012). 
We apply a mixed methods approach to our field of research, as we thereby offset the weaknesses 
combined with working with either quantitative or qualitative data (Bryman, 2012:635-648). We are 
also seeking to obtain a more complete picture of the Sino-African relationship, and it necessitates 
looking into both kinds of data. The strengths are that qualitative data provides account of social 
structures, while quantitative data provides an overview of the process over time (Bryman, 2012: 
633). Furthermore by integrating both kinds of methods, we deliberately seek to strengthen the va-
lidity of our research. We will discuss later in the project on the validity of our findings. 
Our quantitative data is mainly drawn from statistics providing an overview of the process in the 
economic growth and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in African countries. The quantitative data 
also has also served as our point of departure and the narrowing of our analytic targets. We have 
especially focused on the amount of increasing amount of outgoing FDI (OFDI) from China into 
African countries, the specific goods the Sino-African trade relationship has been concerned with 
and the shares of trade. By focusing on these factors, we have uncovered certain mechanisms that 
drive this development. We will get into more details about this in the analysis. Our quantitative 
data are secondary sources drawn from international organizations, international researches or na-
tion-states’ governments (Ibid.: 330-352). We have not gathered primary data, due to the inaccessi-
bility of the necessary informants. We will discuss reliability and validity in more details in a later 
chapter.  
Regarding our qualitative data, these are mainly drawn from secondary sources such as books, jour-
nals and articles. These form the basis of our qualitative empirical data and are used in order to un-
cover the causalities of the ‘deep domain’ concerning the emerging international political trends 
(Buch-Hansen & Nielsen, 2012: 281-284). We apply our qualitative data in order to assess the de-
velopment of the political and economic nature of the Sino-African relationship. Furthermore we 
analyze our qualitative data in order to understand the values in the context in which the Sino-
African relationship is conducted. Our codification is based mostly upon our theories, making our 
codification and conceptualization similar in a high degree (Ibid.: 568). Our main sources are most-
ly books or peer-reviewed articles from acclaimed journals, which we assess to have a relative high 
validity. But as mentioned above, we will discuss validity further into detail in a separate chapter.  
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Interdisciplinarity  
We work interdisciplinary by drawing upon both economic and political features. Economics and 
politics are close related and in relation to the Sino-African relationship, the economic needs have 
been a driver for the policy-making. We will discuss later how China seeks to sustain its economic 
growth by investing and securing raw materials and energy sources in Africa. It also applies the 
other way around, that policy-making is formulating the economic goals. In this regard that China 
seeks to continue its economic growth in order to rise to prominence in the world. We therefore do 
not believe it is possible to differentiate between the political and economic actions exercised by the 
Chinese government. This is furthermore underpinned by our choice of theory, as we demonstrate 
later, which has explicit political and economic perspectives. 
Literature review  
In this part we will first give a brief comment on our access to empirical sources, which also covers 
why we have not collected any primary data. This part is divided into a qualitative and quantitative 
part. Afterwards we will review our qualitative and quantitative data. 
Access to empirical sources  
In this section, we will describe to what end we apply our empirical sources and data, as well on a 
parallel note assess them. We will go into details about specific authors and sources that form the 
core of our empirical data. Furthermore we will discuss the validity and reliability of the projects’ 
findings. 
Qualitative sources 
Due to the relevance of China in international politics, their actions and foreign policy is a well ar-
gumented and researched area and provides several insights into understanding the development of 
China and the Sino-African relationship. We have a large variety data to our disposal regarding the 
rise of China and its implications in international relations. There has also been a growing attention 
directed towards the topic of Sino-African relations gives a large variety of data that is easy acces-
sible. It is however necessary to note the access to Chinese data entails certain controversies. It is 
known that the Chinese government uses active censorship, which we have sought to mitigate with 
comparison to other qualitative sources. In getting an overview However, as stated earlier, we’ve 
had difficulties in regards to getting mail correspondence and possible interviews with experts and 
officials related to the field, which has limited us of acquiring firsthand knowledge and possibly a 
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limitation of our own understanding of the field of interest. We have tried to uplift the lack of inter-
views the expert’s vision on the topic by compensating with an intensive research of articles, jour-
nals and rapports regarding the Sino-African relations.  
Quantitative sources 
As is stated in the previous section, the topic is well debated and several institutions and organiza-
tions are interested in the developments of economic relations due to its impact on the global eco-
nomic market. This means, that there are several channels of acquiring the necessary data that we 
need in order to analyse and comprehend what specific processes are actually taking place. Thus 
making economic statistics and analyses plentiful and easy accessible due to organizations code of 
conduct and making their documents official.  
Qualitative data 
This section will give an introduction and assessments of the most relevant of literature and sources 
implemented in this project. Furthermore we will describe to what end we apply our sources. This 
part concurrently includes a description of our sources’ methods in relation to collecting data. 
Rothberg’s work (2008) transpired from a seminar with experts from Harvard University’s Kennedy 
School of Government’s Program on Intrastate Conflict, the World Peace Foundation, and the Cen-
ter for Global Development to the seminar at the Kennedy School to discuss the impacts that a part-
nership between China and Africa will mean for the African states (Rothberg 2008: ix). Rothberg 
(2008) is a compilation of several essays and studies, which focuses on different aspects of issues 
related to the Sino-African relationship. Among others renowned contributors are Deborah 
Brautigam and David Shinn, who we use throughout our project. They are strongly merited in their 
respective occupations and both have had intimate interaction with the Sino-African relationship 
(Ibid.: 312-317). Rothberg himself is director at Harvard University and former president of the 
World Peace Foundation. Rothberg (2008) serves mainly to give an overview of the development of 
the Sino-African relationship with specific focus on FDI, oil-trade and the intensifying economic 
and political relationship. 
The study done by Ian Taylor (2009) is based on a variety of different approaches such as field-
work, interviews and archival research, throughout the Sub-Saharan countries of Africa (Taylor 
2009: ix). We apply his work in order to assess the intensifying Sino-African relationship in eco-
nomic terms and specifically the oil trade. Is also covers the intensifying political relationship but in 
a slightly less degree. We also apply it in order to get an overview of the historic development of 
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the Sino-African relationship. As well as relying and comparing the collected research with that of 
Asian, African and European universities department of developments, international seminars and 
relevant colleagues (Ibid.: ix). We apply Taylor (2009) parallel to the use of Rothberg (2008) and 
Alden et al. (2009) in order to assess and increase the reliability. Ian Taylor is a professor in the 
School of International Relations at St. Andrews and University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. Ian 
Taylor’s former publications reveal an intimate knowledge of the African continent with focus on 
African development.  
Alden et al. (2009), is a compilation of contributions of an international team of experts in African 
and Chinese foreign affairs and economic developments (Alden et al. 2009: ix). We apply Alden et 
al. to in conjunction with Rothberg (2008) and Taylor (2009) to further support our overview of 
Sino-African relations. Specifically in the Sino-African trade relationship as well as bilateral politi-
cal relationship. These experts are based on several different universities as senior researches and 
professors. Their papers and essays are based on both fieldwork and interviews as well as compar-
ing to earlier stages of research. The contributions have also been subject to several revisions (Ibid.: 
x).  
The three books thus form the core of our empirical data and in order to further support it, we make 
an extensive use of journals and newspaper articles. Most of the articles are drawn from journals 
focused on economic, political and military issues in relation to China or China in international rela-
tions. Most of the authors also occupy different positions at universities or possess intimate 
knowledge through direct interaction with the field. Newspaper articles are used in a slightly lesser 
degree and to support our findings drawn from the core of empirical data as well as journals.  
Quantitative data  
In this part, we will describe the origins of our quantitative data and briefly assess their reliability. 
Our main quantitative data is derived from a study conducted by Thilo Hanemann, research director 
at Stanford Center for International development and materials collected and processed by Trade 
Law Centre in Stellenbosch, South Africa.  
The data Thilo Hanemann has several merits that underpin his value as a source of quantitative data. 
His main focus in his work through the Rhodium Group has been on an emerging Asia, specifically 
China concerning economic and policy relations. In this regard he has published several articles and 
his work has been approved and used by the US government, serving as a testimony of his quality. 
Furthermore he has his research been published by the Peterson Institute for International Economic 
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(Forbes, 11-12-2013). We apply his study in order to get an overview of the development in the 
Sino-African trade and economic relationship. Yet it should be noted, that the data is somewhat 
lacking in transparency.  
The data collected and compiled by the Trade Law Centre shows the entire official trade between 
all the African countries and China. We apply this data in our analysis of the economic intensifica-
tion of Sino-African relationship. It shows that there is significant growth in Africa’s share of the 
total Chinese trade and the two entities are becoming more connected on several factors. The data is 
originally sourced from Global Trade Atlas and furthermore the data covers only official data, 
therefore not including for instance clandestine sales of arms.  The credibility of the Trade Law 
Centre is rather high and serving to its testimony is the financial and political support of the Swiss 
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs and its long-term collaboration with several national gov-
ernments (tralac, 12-12-2013). Furthermore the staff holds several degrees of honors from several 
renowned universities, such as University of Stellenbosch and University of Cambridge (ibid.)  
Social Research Criteria  
This section in the chapter of methodology will be concerned with the criteria of reliability and va-
lidity.  
Reliability  
When addressing the subject of reliability, we must look to the establishment of whether our data, 
and therefore also if our research is reliable. This means we as researches must consider the quality 
of the data, which is used in the project and how we portray and use such data (Bryman 2012: 46).  
In order to ensure a high reliability of our data, we have sought to apply empirical data and sources 
from renowned authors. This is not necessarily equivalent to a high reliability, but it does provide a 
relative good point of departure. We have assessed our core empirical data and sources in relation to 
reliability as discussed above. It should be noted that in relation to our epistemological perception, 
even though these institutions might be influenced by a high level of professionalism, we 
acknowledge the fact that all knowledge can be misleading. In order to combatant the tendency of 
solitary data, we chose whenever possible a wide field of analysis and inclusion of sources examin-
ing the same field of research. This has been applied in all three parts of the analysis in which we 
draw upon several sources and data. This triangulates our data sets that are both of a quantitative 
and qualitative nature in order to make a consistent analysis by cross checking different findings 
and thus increasing the reliability (Bryman 2012: 717).  
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Due to our reliance on secondary sources and data sets, we have gone into great lengths to ensure 
the reliability, by triangulation of the data sets. We have sought to do so consistently throughout the 
project in order to produce reliable findings. Based on our literature review, we generally find that 
the applied data and sources are reliable, partly due to their origins from renowned organizations 
and/or authors, partly as the triangulation through the application of data. 
Validity  
This part will assess the validity of the project in terms of the framework of the project.  
As we argue the reliability and the quality of our research is acceptable, we need to assess the valid-
ity of the project. This reflects if our data answer our research question, and if that is the case, what 
is the relation between theory, operationalization and the objects of analysis. 
The theoretical framework of Arrighi and Modern World Theory lead us to specific observable pat-
terns that illustrates and highlights certain trends of the interstate system, thereby the observable 
reality by which we, while being critical of our data, conclude upon. The general approach of this 
project is not concerned interviews or mail correspondences, making it entirely dependent on sec-
ondary sources and observable patterns of actions, which we analyze and interpret on the premises 
of the theory. This makes the theory our analysis’ primary framework and a wide scope of analysis 
with the effects of triangulation making the project’s operational framework quite transparent. 
However, in order to keep the triangulation and compatibility of the different data sets reasonable, 
we’ve established somewhat crude operational definitions, in order to obtain this wide variety of 
data and its application. One problem that takes precedence is the fact that most of our qualitative 
sources, however certified and substantial, are up to five years old therefore opens the argument 
whether or not the findings are still valid. We still see the project as being valid despite relative old 
sources, due to the collection and timeframe of which they have been conducted, giving insight in 
trends and not specific analysis of limited timeframes.  
In sum, the validity of the project is based on the reliability of our data sets, by reflecting whether 
our data can be labeled as respective and keeping consistency in the application of the data sets 
while creating a transparent operational framework. 
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Theoretical framework 
In this chapter, we will give an introduction to the key concepts of Wallerstein that Arrighi also 
applies in his own theory. Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory is essential to understanding 
Arrighi’s Modern World Theory. First we will describe Wallerstein’s notions of the hegemonic cy-
cle and hegemony as systematic leadership. Second, we will describe Arrighi’s concepts of hege-
monic transition and his perception of Wallerstein’s hegemonic cycles, including hegemonic crisis, 
systematic expansion and hegemonic breakdown. Third, we will discuss what a possible offensive 
realist analyst would have contributed to our research, had we chosen such a theoretical framework.  
Last, we will describe how we operationalize and apply Arrighi’s Modern World Theory in relation 
to the Sino-African relationship.  
Wallerstein’s hegemonic cycle 
In this part, we will describe Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory and several key concepts that 
relate to the decline of old hegemons and the rise of new hegemons. Furthermore we will briefly 
describe systematic chaos, competitive expansion and tracklaying.  
Within World Systems Theory there exists the term of “bifurcation” which means within the chaos 
followed by a beginning of a transition phase, order changes meaning. It is no longer to be under-
stood by the definitions set by the declining hegemonic state, but rather by the consolidation of the 
new hegemon (Arrighi et al., 1999: 22). However, this process is without a specified timeframe and 
it falls to the researcher to examine exactly which state is creating order, when there appears to be 
none. Nevertheless there will emerge subtle patterns of order, and it is these patterns that is im-
portant to analyze, since it will support the interpretation of how the reorganization of power is tak-
ing place (Ibid.: 22). This is furthermore similar to the deep domain and the generative mechanisms 
mentioned in the chapter about critical realism. 
These patterns of order within the systematic chaos are key concepts to understanding what funda-
mental changes are taking place within the structure of the interstate system. The emerging patterns 
of reorganization is what we define as periods of hegemonic transitions shows itself in change of 
economic, political or military capabilities. The creation of these patterns are done by the emerging 
hegemonic state, which is defining the new structures and reorganization of the interstate system. 
These new structures, as they are being established, will be perceived as “tracklaying vehicles” for 
other states to follow. This was done by the US after WWII with the Bretton Woods system. There-
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fore there the rise of an emerging hegemon to leadership1 is inevitable and will change the flows of 
the system as well as processes’ flows and how they are embedded. Thus the formation and expan-
sion of the World Systems Theory is not based on a single track laid with the foundation of the 
Treaty of Westphalia, but through several switches to different tracks marked by the fall and rise of 
different hegemons such as the Dutch and British Empires. They founded new complex agencies 
within the world system, by leading the system in a new direction (Arrighi et al., 1999: 22).  
According to Wallerstein, and how it has been portrayed by the Dutch, British and US hegemony, is 
the result of long periods of competitive expansion. At the end of this period the declining hegemon 
reaches a specific point, where its political, economic and military capabilities cannot control the 
course of the interstate system any longer. Afterwards, a period of concentration of economic and 
political power takes place, which also marks beginning of systematic chaos. This condition will not 
end until a new hegemon appears. This concentration follows a very distinctive pattern, and the 
rising hegemon acquires first a decisive edge in production, then in commerce and at last in finance2 
(Arrighi et al., 1999: 23). As we will demonstrate later in our analysis, this has so far been the case 
with the rise of China. 
However the fight for hegemony is not secure until the rivalry that develops out of the competitive 
expansion has been through what Wallerstein calls a climatic world war. Historically, this has been 
evident in the Thirty Years War (1618 – 1648), the Napoleonic Wars (1792 – 1815) and the long 
Eurasian wars (1914 – 1945). The Eurasian wars include the two world wars, but Wallerstein con-
siders them as being a continuing war with a stalemate. This climatic word war consolidates the 
emerging hegemon as well as being profitable in itself. The victor will expand its economic edge 
through the processes of war and afterwards follows a state of hegemony (Arrighi et al., 1999: 24). 
Conversely, the recent development of globalization and interdependencies between states make 
such a climatic world war unlikely, since the costs of using military force have increased and the 
benefits from such force has decreased, thereby minimizing the gains (Sørensen et al. 2007: 103). 
                                                 
1 The concept of leadership by the emerging agency is a crucial element of systematic transition, and will there-
fore be explained in detail in a separate chapter.    
2 This corresponds to concepts in other works by Wallerstein in regards to cash flows, the constant reorganiza-
tion and transformation in the interstate system of core, semi-periphery and periphery states. The concept itself 
is based on unequal economic and political relationships in which certain industrialized nations and their global 
corporations dominate the core of the world’s economic system. The lack of inclusion in this study of these theo-
retical concepts is not neglect or disregard but that the work of Arrighi is based upon these concepts. Further 
information about these theoretical concepts, can be found in the work, World System Analysis (Wallerstein 
2004). 
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Nevertheless a stage of Global Liberalism takes precedence in which the hegemon enforces the 
principle of free flow of factors of production. In other words, global liberalism supports the 
hegemon’s economic prowess by sharing of technology and serves as state building to a certain 
degree to increase the production and purchasing power of the interstate system. Though the 
hegemon profits from being in this position as the most advanced and powerful state, the stage of 
global liberalism also leads to the hegemon’s own demise (Arrighi et al., 1999: 24). By sharing its 
technological advances and expertise, and to maintain maximum efficiency of production, it also 
involves the technological development of other competing states. This development will eventually 
undermine the hegemon’s superiority in production, then commerce and last in finance. The system 
therefore reverts or starts over to a new period of competitive expansion, until another state emerges 
that has the necessary potential to achieve the advantage of the three stages (Ibid.: 24) 
Figure 1 summarizes the key concepts of Wallerstein’s hegemonic cycle. 
 
Figure 1. Wallerstein’s hegemonic cycle (Arrighi et al. 1999) 
Hegemony as systematic leadership 
In this part we will describe how hegemony can take two forms when coercing groups of nation-
states in international relations. These two forms are inspired by Antonio Gramsci’s notion of su-
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premacy of a social group. Furthermore we will describe how hegemony is related to the two coer-
cion forms. 
We will borrow a concept from Antonio Gramsci that is concerned about hegemonic coercion: “The 
supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as “domination” and as “intellectual and 
moral leadership” (Gramsci 1971: 57-58). Domination is to be understood as forced coercion, 
which could include application of military means, economic or political sanctions. On the other 
hand, intellectual and moral leadership is the compliance of a group to an actor that presents itself 
and is perceived as the bearer of a general interest (Arrighi et al. 1999: 26). A current example of 
domination that led to forced coercion is the invasion of Afghanistan by the US and its allies, while 
an intellectual and moral leadership has been applied through China’s policy of non-intervention in 
relations to its economic investments in Africa. We will discuss this further into details in the chap-
ter of analysis. 
Hegemony is thus something more than mere domination. Hegemony is linked to legitimacy in con-
trast to domination. The acceptance of an emerging hegemon’s aspiration to hegemony falls to the 
actors in the interstate system. The emerging hegemon will then lead the system in a direction that 
is not only beneficial to the hegemon’s interest, but also be perceived as beneficial to subordinate 
groups. They will more or less relate their own interests to that of the hegemon and thus benefit 
from such a direction. Hence, a hegemon’s interests are then seen as being a general interest em-
bedded in its hegemony than merely its own interests (Arrighi et al. 1999: 26). If the opposite oc-
curs it is referred to as a Power Deflation, which is used to term situations where governmental con-
trol cannot be exercised without the abrupt use or threat of force. If subordinate groups have confi-
dence in the legitimacy of the hegemon, such conditions can be resorted without the need of domi-
nation. However the hegemon is reliant on the perceived legitimacy of its actions (Ibid.: 26).  
Hegemony and leadership is therefore intertwined and interpreted as Power Inflation in the sense 
that, the hegemon is able to exercise their rule as serving the general interest, thereby not only serv-
ing their interest but the system as a whole. If such a condition fades we are in the condition of 
Dominance without Hegemony and the chance of conflict and war has increased (Arrighi et al. 
1999: 27).  However, a side effect of being perceived as the leader of the interstate system, the cho-
sen form of production and governance of the hegemon becomes a role model, or as previously 
mentioned tracklaying vehicle, for the subordinate states in the system. Which will eventually mean 
the downfall for the hegemon.  
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Though how does one define a general interest? According to Arrighi we are working with two 
kinds of aspects of power through leadership, respectively distributive and collective aspects of 
power. Distributive is referred to as a zero-sum game, where an agency can only gain power if an-
other loses some. Collective is referred to as a positive sum game, where cooperation increases 
power for several agencies over a third party or nature (Arrighi et al. 1999: 28). Therefore, in rela-
tion to the general interest, hegemons isn’t represented by distributive means but by the increase in 
collective power. An agency that represent the general interest and will raise its credibility and 
eventually inflates its power. However, it may not be taken seriously if the following isn’t acquired. 
First, it needs the necessary capabilities to lead in such direction of new forms of interstate coopera-
tion. That is break the stalemate of “The tyranny of small decisions” which means ending states 
pursuing their national interests, in short, having the necessary capabilities for world governance. 
Second, having the ability to create system-level solution to system-level problems, therefore mak-
ing the actors within the system feel that the pursuing would-be hegemon has the capabilities to 
meet the demand for systematic governance (Ibid.: 28). If the would-be hegemon accomplished 
such a trait, it can expand its promotion, organization and management of governance and track.  
Giovanni Arrighi and hegemonic transition  
According to Arrighi, the system created by the hegemon allows the states to emulate the 
hegemon’s form of governance and modes of production. Eventually emerging states will catch up 
and even surpass the hegemon due to the interstate system internal promotion of expansion (Arrighi 
et al. 1999: 30). Emulation gives the necessary motivational drive for mobilization of resources, 
interstate cooperation and competition and ultimately reorganization of the system. This means 
hegemonic transitions occur due to the embedded functions in the structure and will be inevitable. 
These expansions increase the volume and density of the system, terms by Durkheim and applied by 
Arrighi (Ibid.: 30). That is, when the number, variety and velocity of the interactions of the transac-
tions between states increase. Over time, the increase in volume and density in the system will lead 
to intensified interstate competition and existing institutions will become increasingly incapable of 
handling the intensification. This eventually leads to a new condition of tyranny of small decisions 
and a deflation of the hegemons power with the addition of starting a hegemonic crisis (Ibid.: 30).  
Crisis of hegemony and systematic expansion 
As figure two shows, two distinctive processes characterize a hegemonic crisis: Intensification of 
great power rivalries and emergence of new loci of power on the margins of the declining 
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hegemon’s radius of action (Arrighi et al. 1999: 65). How these take form has varied from each 
hegemonic transition, but nevertheless some combination of the three have been present. These two 
processes are furthermore associated with a process of systemwide financial expansion centered on 
declining hegemon, which is characterized by two different approaches. First, a reorganization of 
the system with a more efficient division of labour and specialization of production in order to meet 
new demands. Second, when another state emulates the hegemon’s modes of production in order to 
catch up and compete with the hegemon, it also lead to an increased expansion in the system (Ibid.: 
31). When the financial expansion starts in the system, a fourth process of financial expansion be-
gins. This financial expansion in the system is a result of two complimentary tendencies: First, an 
over accumulation of capital and second, an intense interstate competition of the very same capital. 
The first tendency creates the supply conditions of financial expansion, while the second creates 
their demand conditions (Ibid.: 31).  
As the profits of trade and production increase above the ordinary channels of investment, com-
merce and finance, the emulating state will be able to temporarily dominate the economic activities 
of the system. Arrighi comments such developments of accumulation of capital start, when the 
hegemon has lost its competitive advantages. This is also referred to as “a sign of autumn” (Arrighi 
et al. 1999: 32). However, even though the hegemon has lost its advantages, it will still possess fi-
nancial influence in forms of loans or investments due to its accumulated wealth during the process 
of global liberalism (Ibid.). Mapping this expansion of would-be hegemons is an important feature 
to analyze, as the transformation is, what figure two defines as systematic chaos. This is a result of 
one of the three processes characterized earlier in the chapter on systematic crisis.   
According to the theory, financial expansion creates new flows of capital which lead to cashboxes 
(Arrighi et al. 1999: 42). Being a cashbox refers to a great accumulation of capital in a state that 
experience a heightened position in the international financial market. These new cashboxes emerge 
within the transition between hegemonic crises to hegemonic breakdown. This is due to the spread 
of mobile capital to emerging states and markets, which is followed by a period of escalating rivalry 
for mobile capital. The rivalry consists in a competition for the limited mobile capital in these 
emerging markets, to boost their own economies due to the prospect of more profitable conditions. 
The emerging states will benefit most, since they will experience a trade account surplus. The sur-
plus can in turn be applied as state loans to other states that will experience an increasing deficit as 
a result of the changes in the flows of capital and their declining competitiveness (Ibid.). This will 
eventually eradicate the hegemon’s surplus of capital and increase their indebtedness as well as 
35 
 
making it possible for the new cashboxes to reimburse their debts, they obtained during the finan-
cial expansion.  
Hegemonic breakdown 
The next phase of a transition is a hegemonic breakdown, to which there are related additional pro-
cesses, as depicted in figure two. The first is the disintegration of existing systemic organization, 
where the institutions and organizations created by the hegemon begin to lack authority. They are 
unable to uphold its status in the economically and politically spheres of interest. Thus, the disinte-
gration of the hegemon’s power is also the beginning of a period of systematic chaos. The second is 
an escalation of the interstate power struggle, which can result in disputes over specific areas and 
possibly escalate into conventional warfare. The third is a centralization of military and financial 
capabilities in the hands of the rising hegemon, which is the peaceful transition between the declin-
ing and the emerging hegemon. Therefore it also indicates, there does not need to be a period of war 
or prolonged conflict in order for a transformation to unfold. This does not deny a possible combi-
nation of the different processes, but is also includes the possibility of a peaceful transition as in 
contrast to Wallerstein. 
 
Figure 2. The dynamics of hegemonic transitions (Arrighi et al. 1999) 
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The condition of hegemonic breakdown and systematic chaos is a situation of severe and irreversi-
ble systematic disorganization. This is based on the fact the interstate rivalry and conflicts will have 
reached such a volume and density in its interactions, it bursts the system built by the hegemon, 
therefore making the existing structure irrelevant. During this period of chaos a new system will be 
rebuilt based on a new dominant state, which has the superiority in production, commerce and even-
tually finance. Further the new dominant state will have achieved a more influential status in politi-
cal prestige than the declining hegemon, thereby gradually replacing the old hegemon. (Arrighi et 
al. 1999: 31-32). Until a credible and acknowledged state has gone through a combination of the 
mentioned processes, several dominant actors within the system will rise in power and a condition 
of tyranny of small decisions will rule international discourse, therefore increasing the demand for 
system governance. This demand, however, can only be met if the emerging hegemon has the nec-
essary capabilities for systematic organization (Arrighi et al., 1999: 34).  
John F. Mearsheimer and offensive realism - A different perspective  
In this part, we will describe what offensive realism as described by John Mearsheimer could have 
contributed to our project. We will briefly describe offensive realism in general and then specify 
what an offensive realist analysis of China as an emerging hegemon would have focused on. 
The neo-realistic approach of Mearsheimer is based on the security competition and regional he-
gemony. According to Mearsheimer, the interstate system is based on anarchy, and states will al-
ways pursue opportunities to dominate other states out of fear of being dominated themselves, since 
it is the only way states can ensure security (Mearsheimer 2004: 184). Smaller states will seek to 
align themselves in alliance organizations in order to secure their survival. Natural security is al-
most non-existent due to three factors. First, there is a lack of global governance and policing. Sec-
ond, states always have some kind of military force, which even initially being deployed as defen-
sive means, always will have a potential for offensive actions. Third, states never know how another 
state may act or react, therefore creating an indefinite condition of uncertainty. States will therefore 
always strive to become the most dominant state due to the security gains which in turn will entail 
hegemonic aspirations.  
An offensive realist analysis of China as an emerging hegemon would have entailed focus on the 
power relations between China and the current dominant hegemon, the US. The offensive realist 
analysis would also assume a Westphalian and Hobbesian perception of actors in the international 
system and the international system itself. In this regard, we would look into a balancing of power 
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and the apparent weakening of the US concurrently with the rise of China and China’s expansion in 
power relations. The analytical aim would focus on China’s increasing confrontational style in East 
Asia towards the US as the traditional hegemon in Asia as well as other regional powers such a Ja-
pan, South Korea and Vietnam. The offensive realist analysis would therefore focus on international 
issues such as global dominance through the buildup in military capabilities. With the inclusion of 
regional powers in the analysis, we would also seek to assess the risks of confrontations between 
the regional powers and China’s great power ambitions. An offensive realist analysis would also 
entail delimitations from examining NGO’s and IGO’s, as Mearsheimer does not acknowledge their 
importance in international relations. This is mainly because of Mearsheimer’s perception of inter-
national relations being a Hobbesian-Westphalian perception. 
However we do not agree with the premises argued by Mearsheimer, specifically on the anarchistic 
nature of international relations and the security dilemma an offensive realist analysis implies. 
However an offensive realist analysis offers deep insights to the ongoing military buildup in East 
Asia. It also qualifies to explain issues such as the current debate in Japan whether to hold a vote on 
establishing a Japanese military that would make Japan independent of US military. Furthermore, 
offensive realism could offer explanations into how China is reasserting them as the regional 
hegemon in East Asia and its current tensions with South Korea and Japan over disputed territory in 
the East China Sea. 
Operationalization of theory  
This section will describe our application of theory, philosophy of science and methods. We will 
describe the understanding of their interaction, as well as clarifying which objects of analyses that 
will be implemented in the analysis.  
Africa is a key component to China’s further development as previously stated, due to China’s need 
for African resources to ensure the continuation of its economic growth. In this part we will briefly 
describe how we apply our philosophy of science, theory and methods in order to engage with our 
subject.  
In the following analysis, we apply our philosophy of science in the sense we use World System 
Theory in the way we observe the actions and current development of today. In order to reveal cau-
salities of the deeper domain as described in the chapter of philosophy of science, we juxtapose 
Arrighi’s notion of financial expansion and systematic chaos with the critical realism’s notion of 
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deeper domain as the generative mechanisms and potential causalities. This juxtaposition also 
serves to how we structure and analyze on our observations in the data and sources, as we in that 
sense observe the empirical and actual domain which compares to the events we analyze in, such as 
the increased financial engagement between China and Africa. In the process of analyzing the past 
occurrence of events related to the rise of China into our theoretical framework, we are revealing 
the deeper domain and the generative mechanisms as well as conceptualize  
In relation to Wallerstein, we have experienced a stage of global liberalism during the last couple of 
decades and spread of technological expertise as well as the American mode of production to com-
peting actors or agencies in the interstate system, as their status as a tracklaying vehicle brings with 
it. Therefore creating the conditions for their loss of competitive edge and giving way to competi-
tive expansion. In our dissertation, we argue that we now find ourselves in the midst of the first 
stage of Wallerstein’s hegemonic cycle with China’s consolidating themselves as getting the neces-
sary advantages in production, commerce and finance that is relevant to this stage. This phase is 
also greatly related to the similar processes of financial expansions as explained by Arrighi. China 
has over the last couple of years asserted themselves as a rather important economic factor in inter-
national relations, and due to this development, one may point to China as the new economic cash-
box of the interstate system, argued by their large accumulation of economic power. We argue for 
this statement that we believe that the next phase of financial expansion is partly illustrated in the 
partnership between China and Africa followed by the political and military processes that further 
argument for our hypotheses.  
The following analysis will therefore investigate the relationship between China and Africa in the 
terms of the last stage of financial expansion. In the sense that, China is developing Sub-Saharan 
African states in order to both manage their own sustainability and develop a region for long term 
conditions of commerce and political agreements and support. This analysis will provide arguments 
for our hypothesis that argues China is truly showing signs of becoming the next hegemon.  
The decline of American hegemony and the emergence of chaos 
This chapter is meant to give a brief introduction to some of the processes that is currently under-
mining American hegemony. This will be done by exemplifying how the US has lost its military 
credibility and political leadership as well as how the US has become ever more dependent on Chi-
na. Arrighi defines this as a terminal crisis that is evident in the wars in the Middle East (Arrighi 
2007: 178). It argues that the American hegemony is waning and giving way to new aspiring pow-
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ers. We acknowledge the processes that have led to these developments such as the signal crisis, the 
various economic crises and American Belle Epogue, yet the effects of this terminal crisis will pro-
vide the necessary understanding of why we choose to analyse the specifics of the relationship be-
tween China and Africa.  
The decline of military legitimacy and political leadership 
Since the end of WWII in 1945, the United States was by far the world’s most powerful state, due 
to its advantages in production and efficiency that was unmatched by contemporary powers (Wal-
lerstein a, 29-11-2013). Their position as the economic powerhouse of the world meant that it could 
out-compete all other states and it was due to this economic base, the United States established their 
period of hegemony (Wallerstein b, 29-11-2013). Not to mention its political consolidation and in-
fluence as well as their military capabilities and their ability to deploy nuclear weapons practically 
anywhere in the world (Wallerstein a, 29-11-2013). However, the United States still faced the threat 
of the USSR, but due to the nuclear deterrence, both parties signed the Yalta agreement (Ibid.). The 
agreement specified the division of spheres of interest, providing an economic and political frame-
work, which was later institutionalized into the alliance organizations of NATO and the Warsaw 
pact. The agreement was uphold throughout the Cold War, even though the deal was not specific, 
thus retaining the status quo (Wallerstein 2006: 79). However this deal also became one of the erod-
ing factors of the bipolarity. First, the Unites States proved successful in rehabilitating European 
and Japan markets as they reached economic parity with US, but in turn, their markets eventually 
began to expand into American markets. Second, the developing countries of the world refused the 
perceived constellation of the world, leading to multiple revolutions of 1968 (Wallerstein a, 29-11-
2013). The historic development eventually led to the fall of the Soviet Union and the United States 
quickly proclaimed themselves as the leader of the free world (Ibid.).  
However, when questioning who actually profited from the fall of the Soviet Union, none is the 
wiser, as Robert Gilpin remarks “[t]here is no consensus on who in fact really won the Cold War, if 
indeed anyone did” (Arrighi et al. 1999: 4). This is also reflected in the widespread debate, in which 
there is little or no consensus when trying to determine whether a new world hegemonic state is 
emerging, and if that is the case, which state is next in line as the next hegemon. Most would argue 
that the United States is still the dominant power with statements in the scientific literature such as 
“Now is the unipolar moment” and “There is but one first-rate power and no prospects in the im-
mediate future of any power to rival it” (Ibid.: 4). With the collapse of communism, Fukuyama de-
clared “Liberal democracy remains the only coherent aspiration that spans different regions and 
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around the globe.” The American declaration of a New World Order found international support, 
which was further consolidated in President Bush’s confrontation with Saddam Hussein’s invasion 
of Kuwait (Arrighi 2007: 3). The US/UN victory in the Gulf War gave credibility to the idea of a 
new world order was emerging in the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR. Yet this idea, in the 
words of John A. Halls was “A sick joke (Ibid.: 3)”, due to the following years of widespread and 
escalating violence. This line of thought was also picked up by Immanuel Wallerstein:  
”Today, the United States is a superpower that lacks true power, a world leader 
nobody follows and few respects, and a nation drifting dangerously amidst a 
global chaos it cannot control” (Wallerstein b, 29-11-2013) 
Despite the ongoing debate, we as students of IR recognize the United States still maintains its posi-
tion as the most important single economy in the world, which still holds the world’s most ad-
vanced and largest military power. This statement is thoroughly proven and we do acknowledge 
they still maintain a superior edge in political, military, economic and influential resources. Yet, 
there are several developments in the last decade that shows trends to the opposite. One of the most 
discussed and evident is President Bush’s attempt of creating The New American Century. This was 
perceived to be the Bush administration’s endeavor to bring into existence the first truly global em-
pire in world history (Arrighi 2007: 7). Arrighi comments this endeavor as failed, due to what he 
terms as The Vietnam Syndrome and its like in Iraq. In Iraq, the US had difficulties in overwhelm-
ing the resistance of a relatively insignificant military adversary, and as a result, jeopardized the 
credibility of US military might. The additional inclusion of Afghanistan in the project was sup-
posed to revert the trend, but showed the same difficulties which also were evident in Vietnam 
(Ibid.: 179). The project’s initiation and failure in Iraq has substantially reduced the American he-
gemony and their prospects for a slow decline. Immanuel Wallerstein comments on the same 
tendencies in the Middle East. 
“Whenever a state uses military force, anything less than overwhelming victory 
actually reduces that state’s real military power” (Wallerstein b, 29-11-2013) 
American credibility will continue to be questioned as the US attempts of policing the world fails, 
such as the failed US-led humanitarian mission in Somalia. Secretary of state Madeleine Albright 
framed the situation:  
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“What’s the point of having this great army you’re always talking on about if we 
can’t use it?” (Arrighi 2007: 180) 
Besides questioning American leadership, the wars in the Middle East brought their military capa-
bilities and their resolve into question besides the fact, while at the same time have been a costly 
affair and only resulted in an even deeper deficit in national debt and increasing military expenses. 
Added to their already struggling economy, this factor is considered one of many blows that trans-
formed the situation from one of slow decline into one of hurried collapse of the US hegemony. By 
the end of the financial crisis, it is considered that the United States had lost its credibility not only 
as an economic powerhouse but also as the political leader of the world system (Arrighi 2007: 197). 
We therefore argue the current situation in geopolitics is showing signs that the interstate system is 
changing and that we are in the midst of a phase of global power shifts. Even more, the lack of 
common grounds and a political consensus in regards to international conflict, as evident in the con-
tinuation of the Syrian civil war, is another argument that we are in a process of radical reorganiza-
tion of the modern world system. The system has stabilized international relations since the end of 
the WWII is reaching its completion. With the fading of the unipolar moment, it is slowly giving 
way to a new international system characterized by a multilayered and cultural diverse polarity 
(Arrighi et al, 1999: 21, Geeraerts 2011: 1). This condition is what is also referred to as systematic 
chaos (Arrighi et al., 1999: 21). 
Taking these argumentations and the processes of a waning military legitimacy and political leader-
ship into account, the US is experiencing a power deflation due to its inability to lead the interstate 
system in its general direction. Instead it seeks enforce its domination through threat or application 
of force. Such a condition is referred to as dominance without hegemony and even though we can-
not proclaim this to be true at our present time, we argue that such a condition is becoming more 
visible in international relations (Arrighi 2007: 149).  
The increasing dependence of Sino-American economic partnership and China’s ascent in 
international political economy.  
John F. Mearsheimer echoed Wolfowitz’s (1992) argument that foreign policy of the United States 
should be “To prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under 
consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power” because of the wars in the Middle 
East as well as the rise of China (Johnson 2004: 85-6). His acknowledgment of China’s rise has lead 
Mearsheimer to suggest the agenda of American foreign policy should be to try and contain China’s 
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rise in order to slow it down and maintain US influence by a balancing coalition3 (Arrighi 2007: 
203). Yet this feat has not proved successful, actually, quite the contrary. Since the US has been 
bogged down in the Iraq, they have been forced to deepen the relationship with China instead of 
trying to isolate it (Arrighi et al., 1999: 204). The more the US got involved in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and the War on Terror, the more they became dependent on cheap foreign credit and commodities, 
therefore completely reversing the condition of control predicted by Mearsheimer. Though one 
might still see remnants of this strategy by supporting Japan and disclaiming China’s right over 
specific geographic airspace, yet one could argue due to the United States dependency on China that 
it is more bark than bite (The Huffington Post, 06-12-2013). At first, the inflow of capital to secure 
the escalating US balance deficit was primarily sponsored by allied Asian governments, such as 
Japan. This meant the leverage followed by the indebtedness because of US policies posed no im-
mediate problem, since they were dependent on American security and influence (Arrighi, 2007: 
195). Yet with the emergence of China as a new economic pole for investments and exports, China 
became increasingly relevant and posed a potential threat due to their growing role as financers of 
the American deficit (Ibid.: 195). This consequently meant that they would have a say in relation to 
future US policies. However, it is important to note that it was not just China who gained influence, 
as US became more dependent on a variety of creditors to sustain their balance of payments, who 
are not necessarily US Allies. 
“We are increasingly counting on a group of creditors who are not our closest friends 
but have a bigger and bigger stake in America” (Arrighi, 2007: 191).  
The states, which are financing the escalating national debt of the US and hold US currency in their 
banks, also hold US prosperity in their hands (Arrighi, 2007: 202). This increasing leverage became 
ever more evident in 2003 when the US Treasury went to Beijing to negotiate a revaluation of the 
Yuan in order to give American businesses fair means of competition, but to no avail (Ibid.: 204). 
Economist Paul Robin Krugman commented:  
“The U.S. currently has very little leverage over China … Furthermore, the purchases 
of Treasury bills by China’s central are one of the main ways U.S. finances its trade 
deficit … Just four months after Operation Flight Suit, the superpower has become a 
supplicant to nations it used to insult. Mission accomplished!” (Arrighi 2007: 205).   
                                                 
3 The balancing coalition that will include Japan, Vietnam, Korea, India and Russia. The United States would then 
be able to provide support by either direct involvement or by proxy if any dispute seemed of great importance 
(Arrighi 2007: 203).  
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This development is further supported by the 2003 APEC meeting in Bangkok, where international 
politicians and businessmen of Asia were aware of the subtle eroding of US hegemony and their 
influence in the East Asian region. This made other regional countries look towards China as the 
increasingly important regional trading partner, and China is making good progress in catching up 
to the US and its strategic allies, Japan and South Korea, in terms of trade and commerce (Ibid.: 
205). This trend has been intensified over the last couple of decades, and China is now viewed as 
the regional economic drive of the East Asian region. They have several different investments and 
commitments to develop and strengthen it ties to its surrounding countries in political, economic 
and matters of security “Now Southeast Asia, whose leaders have traditionally looked to the United 
States as the anchor of regional security, are speaking out about the need to strengthen their rela-
tionships with Beijing” (The New York Times a, 07-12-2013).  
Making sense of the geopolitical chaos 
The invasion of Iraq was meant to be a tactical achievement of a long-term strategy aimed at using 
military power to consolidate US control over global energy supplies, and thereby having the ability 
to regulate the global economy for another half a century. However, instead of laying the founda-
tions for a continuation of US hegemony, the invasion of Iraq jeopardized US military’s might and 
credibility. This led to a deflation of credibility of US’ leadership of the interstate system and un-
dermined the dominant position of the US$ and its position in the global economy (Arrighi 2007: 
209). Furthermore, the tendency of an increasingly self-confident China as an alternative to leader-
ship in East Asia is becoming more evident, as well as their concurrent emergence as the new cash-
box of the system. This development of a new power on the periphery of the declining hegemon’s 
action of radius is evident. The following analysis will examine how the processes of the next phase 
of financial expansion is taking place with the example of Africa, as well as portraying the devel-
opments in the political and military spheres.  
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Analysis of China as an emerging hegemon 
In this part we will analyze and discuss China’s emergence as a hegemon in relation to the three 
levels of analysis mentioned in our problem statement: The economic, political and military. First, 
the analysis will focus on China as an emerging economic hegemon, cashbox and its financial ex-
pansion. The analysis will target China on a regional and global scale. The regional scale will focus 
on the increasing intensification of the Sino-African trade relationship. Second, the analysis will 
focus on the increasing political influence of China, and its institutionalization of the Sino-African 
relationship in the founding of FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation). We will discuss how 
FOCAC acts as a new track in the interstate system in relation to China’s emergence as a new 
hegemon. Third, the analysis will focus on the increasing commitment to the protection of SLOCs 
in the Indian Ocean and the bay of Aden as being part of the increase in China’s military capabili-
ties. This will frame the issue of systematic problems and how China addresses them.  
The growing importance of China as a global economic focal point and its 
African implications 
This part of the analysis concerned with the emergence of China as an economic hegemon is fur-
thermore divided into two subparts. These two subparts address two levels in which China is finan-
cial expanding: A global and African level. The first subpart is concerned with the emerging eco-
nomic importance of China as the global manufacturer as well as being the advocate for an alterna-
tive economic model rooted in Zhou Enlai’s “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence” than the 
traditional Western one (Jiang, 2009: 587; Taylor, 2009: 14). This subpart confirms China, based on 
the evidence of the great Chinese reserves of foreign currencies, is channeling an unprecedented 
high Chinese OFDI outwards, which is similar to the description made by Giovanni Arrighi in his 
notion of financial expansion.  
The second subpart will look into how the Chinese financial expansion is manifested regionally in 
the Sub-Saharan countries. We argue that China on one hand is seeking to sustain its industrializa-
tion by importing primary commodities and energy4 from Africa, and on the other hand we will 
argue there is a trend of preparing the Sub-Saharan as a market targeted for Chinese export of a 
                                                 
4 With primary commodities we mean common minerals such as iron, copper, zinc, etc. and with energy we mean 
oil and gas. However the analysis of the term primary commodities will vary according to the specific Sub-
Saharan country’s export to China. 
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wide variety of goods. We will later assess the growing importance of China as the main supplier of 
manufactured goods to Africa and what implications this entails.  
The increasing importance of a global economic China 
The data regarding China’s economic ascension confirms China is growing economically – and 
quite fast as well. Several factors are indicating an economic shift in the direction of China. The 
most striking evidences of a more economic significant China are first, China’s foreign exchange 
reserves amounts – according to Trading Economics (17-12-2013) - to 3,66 trillion US$ that can be 
facilitated into OFDI (Outgoing Foreign Direct Investments). Second, its annual economic growth 
in GDP since 1978 has been on average just short of 10 %. Third, in relation to the US, China owns 
a little bit more than over every fifth of US Treasury Securities (tralac, 17-12-2013; U.S. Depart-
ment of Treasury, 17-12-2013). China is thus a cashbox of the system with an increasing expansion 
financially, as well as China holds large shares of US debt it can use as leverage in order to accom-
plish political goals.  
China has gone from being the 8th biggest receiver of FDI inflows to becoming the 2nd biggest in 
2009 (Lian, 2011: 103). Combined with the high rate of savings just short of 40 %, China has been 
able to build up the vast amounts of foreign exchange reserves as it is evident today (Bao et al., 
2006: 125). This had lead China to become the new cashbox of the interstate system. China is cur-
rently in the changing of the existing capital flows of the global market through its increase in 
OFDI. China experimented with OFDI in 1984, but the annual amount of OFDI did not exceed the 
10 billion US$ mark until 2005 (Hanemann, 2009: 4). China needed to secure its supply of finances 
in order to expand financially, but its policymakers were already planning ahead. In 1991, the Chi-
nese government actively encouraged SOE’s of investing internationally that culminated with Chi-
na’s “Going Global Strategy” in 2000 (Ibid.). The “Going Global Strategy” needs to be seen in the 
light of China’s rapid industrialization and market liberalization ushered in by Deng Xiaoping in 
1978, as China’s self-sufficiency changed in 1993 to become dependent on oil-imports (Taylor, 
2009: 39). The need for securing energy sources compelled Chinese policymakers to invest interna-
tionally through Chinese SOE’s in order to supply the energy demand. China was cautiously en-
gaged with OFDI in 1984 but was taking a reluctant approach in encouraging SOE’s to invest 
abroad, which Hanemann’s data shows. The needs for sustaining its industrialization are exempli-
fied in the targets of Chinese OFDI, in which mining in 2004 accounted for 48% of Chinese OFDI. 
However as China is developing its financial sector, the targets of OFDI have been steadily chang-
ing. The development of Chinese OFDI in the mining sector has been in a negative growth, instead 
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the OFDI targeted leasing & commercial services, that includes financial services, which by 2009 
received in 36.21 % of all Chinese OFDI while mining ‘only’ accounted for 23.6% (Lian, 2011: 4). 
This signals a change of focus in Chinese OFDI, indicating the emphasis being put on that China 
takes a step up in the global value ladder, as China is expanding more financially. 
In contrast to Western countries, China is also advocating an alternative approach regarding FDI. 
First, China is basing its OFDI on Zhou Enlai’s “Five Principles of Co-Existence”, which most 
prominently features non-interference in internal affairs and equality and mutual benefits (Taylor, 
2009: 14). This allows China a high degree of flexibility in investing in autocratic countries, which 
Western countries and some multi-national companies (MCN’s) are not capable of doing so due to 
their code of conduct. As China’s actions are not adjusted to the norms of the current hegemon, we 
argue this approach is a new track lain by China. However it is also possible to interpret this fact as 
China being a rogue-player in relation to the current norms of the interstate system, though we will 
not go into details about China being a rogue-player in this project.  
This allowed China to operate its SOE’s in countries such as Sudan because of China’s non-
interference policy (Rothberg, 2008: 12-15). It should be stressed that China is not entirely free of 
international pressure, as in the case of Sudan, China changed its standpoint to one of supporting the 
African Union in a peacekeeping mission in Darfur (Alden et al., 2009: 22). We will go into details 
about the specifics about the Sino-African trade relationship in the second subpart of this analysis. It 
is a fact that because of the autocratic nature of the Chinese government and the basis of its foreign 
policy – including its use of OFDI – is rooted in Zhou Enlai’s “Five principles of co-existence”, 
thereby giving China a more flexible approach to direct its OFDI internationally. Second, the 
“package-approach” China is doing its OFDI also offer its recipient countries several advantages. 
Its focus on improving local infrastructure, cheap credit conditions through the ExIm Bank and in-
cluding projects that are not necessarily profit guaranteed, makes China a more competitive and 
attractive investor. This stands in contrast to the US and Western countries, as China through its 
control of its SOE’s has other success criteria than those related to profit (Rothberg, 2008: 73-77). 
This specifically characterizes its OFDI in Africa, but it is also valid for China’s OFDI in general. 
We will look into how this is specifically designed in an African context in the second subpart of 
the economic analysis. Third, as China is expanding financially, there are also evidences that China 
is also preparing some of its trading partner countries as new markets for Chinese manufactured 
goods. This is partly because of China’s ascension of the global value ladder, as China is actively 
expanding financially in the interstate system. This is mainly aimed at developed countries, as the 
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quality of the goods is not good enough to compete with similar Western goods. This is evident in 
cases regarding Chines cars, but is generally a flaw in Chinese products. This is described by an 
article in the magazine Time: 
“… a 2012 quality survey from the market-research firm J.D. Power shows Chinese-branded cars 
still suffer 80% more initial defects and other problems than international ones in China. "Putting 
together long-lasting, world-tested products — it takes years," says Kevin Wale, former president of 
GM in China. Chinese carmakers "are still going through a learning phase (Time, 18-12-2013)." 
Thus China is still not on par economically with the US, however as the trends disclosed earlier 
reveals an increasing Chinese financial expansion. In other words, China has been financially ex-
panding internationally with first probing the international market in order to get an overview in 
1984 to drastically turning up the outflows of Chinese FDI after the implementation of “Going 
Global Strategy” (Hanenmann, 2011: 4). China is in the midst of a process going from being a big 
intaker of FDI to “ramp up” its amount of OFDI international. These two steps are quite similar to 
what Giovanni Arrighi describes as first the cashbox and then the following financial expansion. In 
general Chinese OFDI still accounts for a very little of the total annual amount of global FDI, but 
the growth of Chinese OFDI is pointing towards an increasing consolidation of China as an great 
power in economic terms (Ibid.). The drastic growth of Chinese OFDI, combined with its current 
absorption of FDI, its amount of foreign exchange reserves and its high rate of savings has enabled 
the current Chinese government to invest heavily on a global scale. Furthermore, the main single 
competitor, the US, and its allies are currently in recession and have also been occupied with the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US has therefore been impeded in their abilities to counter Chi-
na’s global financial expansion. Furthermore the Chinese model of OFDI has several advantageous 
characteristics. First, due to the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence” forming the basis of 
China’s foreign policy, enables China to broker trade deals with other autocratic regimes, which 
Western countries and some MNC’s are not able to. Second, the “package-approach” includes in-
vestments in infrastructure, not-guaranteed profits-projects and the low cost of credit through the 
ExIm Bank makes China a very attractive investor for a range of developing countries. Third, the 
Chinese model of OFDI is partly generated by the demand to sustain China’s ongoing industrializa-
tion. It shows China’s ascension on the global value ladder, while at the same time preparing some 
of its developing trade partners as markets for Chinese manufactured goods. Fourth, China’s grow-
ing importance as a goods manufacturer eclipsed that of the US, marking a milestone in the process 
of China’s economic growth. As of 2012, China traded goods worth 50 billion US$ more than the 
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US, thereby replacing the US as the biggest trader of manufactured goods in the world (Forbes, 11-
12-2013). 
China’s financial expansion in Africa and its implications 
Currently the overall two-way trade between Africa (including Northern African countries) and 
China in 2012 was just short of 200 billion US$, which consisted of little over five percent of Chi-
na’s trade in the world. But it is important to stress that the Sino-African trade has grown 51 times 
since 1995 from just short of 4 billion US$. Meanwhile China’s global trade ‘only’ grew almost 14 
times since 1995, from 281 billion US$ to 3.87 trillion US$ (Annex 3; Annex 4; tralac, 2013). Ar-
guably there is a trend in which the Sino-African trade relationship is growing in its share of Chi-
na’s total trade.  
The trade between the two continents consists of an unequal relationship in terms of traded goods. 
China’s main interest in sustaining its ongoing industrialization is manifested in the top import 
products from Africa, in which minerals and oil products are represented by 89 % of total trade 
from Africa to China. This percentage has been relatively stable since 1995, indicating that China’s 
main economic interest in African goods is in primary commodities and raw materials. Of those 
countries featuring the most prominent exports to China are among others South Africa, Angola, 
Congo (Not to be confused with the Democratic Republic of Congo), Nigeria, Sudan and Zambia. 
Libya also has had a rather larger export to China, but since the eruption of the Libyan Civil War 
and fall of Col. Muammar Gaddaffi, the trade relationship has been disturbed and declined by more 
than half (tralac, 2013.). What characterizes these trade relationships is the amount of either miner-
als or oil products making up between 90 % to almost 100 % of the entire export to China. 99.44 % 
of the Angolan export to China consisted in 2012 of oil and petroleum products, amounting to 33 
billion US$. The Congolese export was almost entirely made up of oil and petroleum products and a 
smaller amount of wood, 93.5% and 6% respectively. 97.1 % of the Sudanese export to China con-
sisted of oil and petroleum products, while in the case of Nigeria it was 87.6 %. The South African 
data is not disclosed in the data. 
In other words, there are several significances in the Chinese import from Africa. First, China is 
focusing on securing raw materials and energy resources for its domestic demand and China has 
been growing exponentially in the African continent in the pursuit of doing so. Except for South 
Africa, the top exporting African countries to China are also of a more or less autocratic political 
character, which underlines China’s flexible characteristics in dealing with less democratic regimes. 
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Second, as the main exports to China are almost entirely consisting of primary commodities, this 
also reveals the lack of manufactured goods exported to China. Instead, as we will go into depth 
with later, China is exporting manufactured goods in a large and diversified degree to African coun-
tries (tralac, 2013.). Third, the top exporting countries to China are geographically located in the 
Sub-Saharan region, indicating a high focus on a region that traditionally has not been given much 
attention from Western countries if it has not been in relations to human rights abuse, elections 
fraud, terrorism and recently, the tragic passing of Nelson Mandela.  
The picture of China’s export to African countries, most notably the Sub-Saharan African countries, 
is entirely different. The bulk of China’s export to Africa has two main characteristics that are tell-
ing on China’s emergence as a potential economic hegemon. First, as China is trying to move up on 
the global value ladder, China’s export to Africa is almost entirely consisting of manufactured 
goods. In comparison to the Chinese import, in which oil and metals as the two main import prod-
ucts made up 89 % of the total import, Chinese top 20 export commodities ‘only’ amount to 35 % 
of the total export (tralac, 2013). This is a strong indication of a strong diversified export, in which 
transportation vessels (both sea, air and land), woven cotton fabrics, electronic parts for telephony, 
footwear and tires are the top 5 export products of China, accruing 13% of the total China export to 
African trade (Ibid.). This indicates a Chinese perception of African countries being markets able to 
absorb Chinese exports and new opportunities to sustain Chinese economic growth. Second, the 
countries targeted by China’s export as of 2012 are the more developed countries in Africa, such as 
South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt, as their relative wealth is able to demand goods that China is able 
to supply, hence the relative high level of export from China. Compared to the imports from Africa, 
China is in the process of channeling capital into countries in exchange for primary commodities, 
developing the countries at the same time China is securing minerals and energy resources (Ibid.). 
This also correlates to the mutual benefit aspect of the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence”.  
The large investments and economic involvement have not been entirely positive. As China has 
grown in its export of cheap manufactured goods, anti-Chinese sentiments have risen. This has been 
evident in Zambia, where total China-Zambian trade is little bit more than 3 billion US$, while most 
of the trade is rooted in Zambian copper being exported to China (tralac, 2013). In 2011, Zambian 
opposition leader won presidential elections, partly because of an anti-Chinese campaign that found 
resonance among Zambians and there are similar signs in Namibia as well (Alden et al., 2009: 238-
245; New York Times b, 11-12-2013). We will not go into details how China’s OFDI is impacting 
the populace, but simply state, that there are implications on a local level as well that have the pos-
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sibility to aspire into a national level. Furthermore it is also necessary to be critical about the pro-
spects of China’s OFDI in Africa. For as long China’s main economic targets in Africa are aimed at 
securing raw materials and energy sources for its domestic demand, African countries that are poor 
and lack natural resources, have been missed in China’s economic involvement in Africa so far. 
Most notably that goes for countries like Seychelles, Cape Verde, Burundi, Eritrea and Guinea-
Bissau (Tralac, 2013). These countries are mostly poor, except the Seychelles – though they have a 
high Gini-coefficient – and generally lack natural resources. Also the non-interference policy pro-
moted by China has also prompted international critique as China is heavily involved with Sudan, 
economic, political and military wise. This had forced China to readjust its non-interference policy 
due to demands of an increasing unpopularity in Africa, but it remains to be seen if China is going 
to change fundamentally in its approach towards its other trade partners (Alden et al., 2009: 94-96).  
Besides the Sino-African trade, the Chinese emphasis on other aspects of OFDI in Africa also in-
cludes promises on other aspects than just exploitation of natural resources. This has been manifest-
ed in Chinese funding of road and railways, improvement infrastructure in energy supply and an 
increase of know-how exchange between various African countries and China (Alden et al., 2009: 
148-150, Rothberg, 2008: 116-117). The access to cheap capital has also improved the attractive-
ness of Chinese economic investments, as they are not regulated or met with same conditions as the 
IMF or World Bank. Especially for more authoritarian regimes, this is welcomed news, which is 
exemplified in the case of Angola, when they in the eleventh hour cancelled negotiations with the 
IMF and signed a deal with China’s ExIm Bank instead. The IMF’s deal preconditioned several 
policy reforms and degrees of transparency, making ExIm Bank’s offer more favorable by not in-
cluding likewise conditions (Rothberg, 2008: 117-121; Adekunle et al., 2013: 119-121). This has 
served to provide better access and higher favorability among African political elites for Chinese 
SOE’s and China in general. Furthermore it is an indication of a long term Chinese commitment to 
the African countries in a mutual beneficial context. This rests in a high degree on the above-
mentioned “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence” that is guiding the economic policies towards 
Africa. Festus Mogae, president of Botswana, also serves as a testimony towards this sentiment 
stating all African countries have benefitted from China’s investments (Rothberg, 2008: 116-117). 
This also serves to build up goodwill towards the notion of China being the biggest developing 
country engaged in a region consisting most of all the developing countries in the world. But the 
notion of the non-interference policy in China’s economic interaction with various authoritarian 
regimes in Africa has also been a target of general critique, prompting an adjustment in this area of 
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policy. This should be seen in the light of the growing importance of China internationally, which is 
increasingly being held accountable for its interactions with regimes that have committed atrocities 
due to China’s aspiration to claim a peaceful rise of a responsible great power (Alden, et al., 2009: 
xviii-xix). 
Sub-conclusion 
This economic analysis has revealed that China’s OFDI has grown considerably since 1978. The 
cashbox effect of China is visible in the light of its position of receiving foreign FDI and its amass-
ing of foreign exchange reserves. As of 1984, China has first been probing the international market 
for targets of its potential OFDI for then drastically increasing its outflow of FDI as an effect of the 
implementation of the “Going Global Strategy”. This has led to an increased consolidation of China 
as an economic focal point of the international trade. The amount of China’s OFDI compared to the 
overall OFDI is still relatively small. Based on the trends we have confirmed in our analysis, China 
is set to grow even more in the near future due to the factors of its large foreign exchange reserves, 
fast growth in outflow of FDI and continued economic growth. The eclipse of the US as the single 
biggest trader in manufactured goods is also a testimony to this trend. The conduct of China’s OFDI 
is in a large extent also rooted in the framework of the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence” 
that seeks to establish mutual benefits between China and its trade partners while at the same time 
keeping to its policy of non-interference in internal affairs. China is internationally expanding fi-
nancially as according to Arrighi’s notion of financial expansion, and China’s process is compli-
mented in the way the US and the West have been faced with a financial crisis and its wars in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq.  
The economic consolidation of China is also evident in a regional context, specifically Africa, in 
which China is seeking further two goals. First they are seeking to secure energy and mineral re-
sources for China’s further industrialization and economic growth which is evident in the goods 
China imports from the African continent. The oil trade in particular is a big factor in this equation. 
Second China is also increasing its export to Africa in order to generate even more wealth, thereby 
further consolidating its international economic position. These goods are very diversified in what 
kind of goods are exported, suggesting a trend in which China perceives African countries as mar-
kets capable of absorbing an increasing amount of Chinese manufactured goods. This is also evi-
dent in the drastic increase in Africa’s share of China’s overall trade (Annex 3; annex 4). China has 
also the flexibility to deal with countries that are internationally condemned, most notably Sudan, in 
order to import resources in a continued effort to fuel its economic growth and ongoing industriali-
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zation. However the development of China’s engagement with Africa has also produced popular 
backlashes, most notably in the election of Zambian president of 2011, who rode into office on 
among other factors an anti-Chinese sentiment. It is however minor details in a general picture that 
suggests a trend in which China is securing better trade relationships with a vast range of African 
countries in order for China to sustain its economic growth. China’s growing engagement and 
commitment to Africa suggests a trend of intensifying interaction between African countries and 
China that is most likely to continue in the near future. This is furthermore helped with the lack of 
capabilities the West has put into the African continent.  
This economic analysis confirms our research hypothesis that states:  
China’s growing level of economic investments in Africa is an international trend supporting its 
emergence as a dominant global actor. 
China’s political engagements in Africa 
The following chapter investigates the increasing political relationship between Africa and China 
and its implication for the interstate system. This will be exemplified by portraying, first, the devel-
opments in Chinese foreign policy and the role of Africa and, second, how the economic relations 
have developed into political commitments. Last, we will assess the analysis 
China’s changing foreign policy and importance of role of Africa 
There are certain developments signifying a change in Chinas foreign policy, whereas the most evi-
dent is its change from avoiding engagements in international organizations to one that is now em-
bracing them (Tull 2006: 459). The reinvigorated engagements with the African continent is a re-
markable transformation of China’s political nature, which undoubtedly defines China as seeking a 
more active role in international politics (Ibid.: 460). This is evident in the way Beijing has increas-
ingly sought and joined several regional institutions and organizations dealing with matters of secu-
rity and economic issues. This has led to the incentive for portraying China’s involvement in inter-
national relations as being one of cooperation and engagement instead of confrontation and with-
drawal as “China is clearly assimilating into the international system”(Ibid.: 460).  
The early periods of Sino-African relations have had many different such as ideology, national lib-
eration, state-to-state aid as well as increasing aid projects (Taylor 2009: 13). Yet as time pro-
gressed, Africa was marginalized by the interstate system, but China quickly resumed and acknowl-
edged the importance of Africa spurred by certain historic developments (Ibid.: 14). The new active 
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approach to international relations by China and specifically towards non-western countries was 
initiated by the massive reaction and criticism by western countries to the massacre in Tiananmen 
Square in 1989, thus adding to the South-South cooperation. The following embargoes and political 
reprisals towards China due to the misconduct in accordance with international norms and human 
rights, forced Beijing to initiate new political relations without the US dominated West (Ibid.: 13). 
According to Tull and Taylor, the Western response to the Tiananmen massacre provided the spark, 
which compelled Beijing to seek closer ties with other developing countries (Tull 2006: 462, Taylor 
2009: 13). This led to new political agreements and alliances with new political actors, as China 
gained the political support and followership they needed.  
“The events of June 1989 … did not affect the PRC’s relations with the third world as 
[they]did with the Western world … what changed [was] the PRC’s attitude toward 
the third world countries, which … turned from one of benign neglect to one of re-
newed emphasis” (Taylor 2009: 14).  
These new South-South agreements soon became a cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy, due to its 
effect of shielding Beijing against western criticism and influence. These new agreements were not 
only beneficial for China, but to developing countries as a whole and especially Africa (Taylor 
2009: 13). 
“It was … our African friends who stood by us and extended a helping hand in the dif-
ficult times following the political turmoil in Beijing, when Western countries imposed 
sanctions on China” (Taylor 2009: 14).  
Furthermore, due to Western demands for liberalization of markets and pressure for democracy, 
African leaders were quick to sympathize with China and resist these demands as interfering with 
state sovereignty (Tull, 2006: 461). The increased engagements of political relations between China 
and Africa were based on similar problems of external pressure for domestic changes, which creat-
ed the basis for a common identity, as well as empowering their international position. This led to 
the consolidation of the South-South relations aimed towards the US. Jiang Zemin’s described Chi-
na’s relationship with Africa: 
“[China] The biggest developing country and Africa, the continent with the largest 
number of developing countries (Tull, 2006: 462).”  
This relationship also gave room for more active maneuvers within the UNSC by China and in other 
international institutions (Tull, 2006: 461). Three years after the June 4th Incident, the Chinese 
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Prime Minister Qian Qichan visited no more than 14 African countries and laid the foundation for 
the ongoing diplomacy which is evident today (Ibid.: 462). In addition, the African countries receiv-
ing Chinese financial aid increased from 13 to 44 in the same period, in total economic numbers the 
aid increased from 60,4 million US$ to 345 million US$ (Taylor 2006: 450).  
Another indication towards implementing a more active foreign policy is based on the consequenc-
es of the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The crisis alerted Beijing to the vulnerabilities of its de-
pendency on outward-orientated economy to external influence, and thus the need for regional and 
international stability (Tull 2006: 461). Beijing expanded its national interests into the interstate 
system through an active foreign policy, based on the fact, that the security of its economic growth 
to its future stability became a strategic goal in itself (Tull 2006: 462, Taylor 2006: 46). With Afri-
can support, this eventually led to China’s membership of the WTO in 2002, and further opened the 
door to the global market and consolidated a foothold (Rothberg 2008: 58).  
The failure of Western initiatives in Africa 
The new developments of China’s active foreign policy and its relation to Sino-Africa relations 
have been increased by the failure of likewise Western initiatives in the African continent (Tull 
2006: 467, Barton et al. 2011: 4).  
Throughout the early 1980’s and 1990’s, Africa experienced several accounts of marginalization 
through decreasing investments and increasing debts. Furthermore, there was a waning interest in 
Africa as international corporations and projects in African countries pulled out or cut down their 
projects (Rothberg 2008: 32). In relation to this development, the Western-inspired reforms of 
Structural Adjustment Programs promoted by IMF further marginalized African countries. The 
backlash of the SAPs gave Beijing an opportunity to get a foothold into Africa. That has undoubted-
ly helped to facilitate Chinese influence on the continent (Tull 2006: 467). The need for alternative 
investments due to the retreat of Western FDI, in this case European, and the increase of Chinas is 
portrayed in the following figure. 
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1 The figure depicts the percentage of share of foreign FDI from European, intra-African and Asian sources channeled to 
Africa as a region. Source: Jacques, 2009: 325  
The failure of the SAPs has benefitted China’s and has in turn lead to the The Beijing Consensus, 
which refers to the  economic development model of China (Rothberg 2008: 32). Furthermore, Chi-
na’s OFDI to African countries have shown to be more beneficial to receiving countries, which do 
not bear the same conditions often attached to Western financial aid, which is referred to as The 
Washington Consensus (Tull 2006: 463, 467).  
“Owing to the failure in the West’s political and economic behavior in Africa, African 
nations, which were only suspicious at first, are now negating Western-style democra-
cy and have reinitiated the “Afro-Asianism” and proposed “going towards the Ori-
ent”. This has opened up for new opportunities for further enriching the content and 
elevating the quality of China-Africa cooperation” (Ibid.: 467).  
China’s approach to development assistance as a new track 
The difference between Chinese and Western aid is found in the several conditions for acquiring 
Western financial aid. These conditions often seek to reform the policies of African countries and 
are in Chinese terms seen as interventionist. Throughout the last two decades, China has on several 
occasions illustrated how the conditions of financial aid and reforms would help indoctrinate Afri-
can countries to Western benefit (Taylor, 2006: 65). These accusations by China has also been ac-
companied in a change of development assistance. In 1993 at the Tokyo International Conference 
on African Development, African countries proclaimed that OFDI should be based on development 
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and production instead of the traditional Western approach (Rothberg, 2008: 33). This correlated 
with earlier Chinese statements of traditional aid as stated by Hu Yaobang:  
“As for economic assistance, the method of sheer gift is disadvantageous to both 
sides, judging from historical experience” (Rothberg, 2008: 33).  
China’s approach to Africa has been one of mutual development, cooperation, equality and bilater-
alism, which have been followed by a change in the patterns of Chinese aid. Instead of unilateral 
aid, China has shifted towards multiple forms of aid such as government deducted-interest loans 
and aid combined with co-investments. Even though Africa has great strategic importance to China, 
their increased relations were primarily based on poverty deduction and consolidating African inde-
pendence from foreign pressure (Rothberg, 2008: 32). China has been increasing their own relations 
with Africa, while the West and the US have suffered from popular backlashes. China has done so 
with a different model of development assistance. We argue China’s actions are deliberately dele-
gitimizing US influence and their track in international relations. Thus by decreasing US influence, 
China is undermining its hegemony in the interstate system. According to Modern World Theory, 
the change of development assistance from traditional unilateral aid to co-development and bilater-
alism is an indication of the increased rivalry between the US and China. This also indicates a new 
track of governance of the interstate system. Furthermore, there has been a change in African for-
eign policies, which indicates the adoption of several sets of active measures to hasten the pace of 
privatization, opening up international trade and reforms based on bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments. We argue this change indicates African economies are beginning to emulate China’s open-
door policy (Taylor, 2009: 14). Thus, a change in development assistance and African emulation of 
Chinese economic policies both indicate an increasing change of tracks in the interstate system.  
One of the most important principles behind the new tracklaying of the interstate system is the role 
of non-interference and equality between states, which is related to the “Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence. These principles differ from the dominant Western approach and the Washington 
Consensus on especially the notion of non-interference in internal affairs (Barton et al., 2011: 6). By 
applying the approach of these principles, China’s approach has been more welcomed in the devel-
oping than the Western countries. This is mainly because equality refers to the respect of sovereign-
ty, mutual benefit, discussion and coordination, which is not safeguarded when negotiating Western 
offers (Rothberg, 2008: 36). The principle of non-interference in Chinese foreign policy is of equal 
importance, since China recognizes the respective countries’ governments. This includes the non-
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interfere in domestic policies, thus respecting the individual country’s sovereignty (Ibid.: 36). This 
was further consolidated in 1992 when China stated they would support African countries’ quest for 
more independence of Western demands, resisting external pressure and the development of Afri-
can economies (Taylor 2006: 66). It should be noted the fallback of Western interests and the in-
creasing replacement with Chinese initiatives also provides valuable diplomatic support from Afri-
can countries (Ibid.: 467). This was in particular evident, when African countries voted for the PRC 
as a replacement of Taipei at the Security Council.  
It becomes clear the economic relationship between developing countries will be based on fair co-
operation, mutual benefit and the principles of equality and sovereignty as part of the Beijing Con-
sensus. Issues such as writing off debt, establishing export zones, initiating projects of infrastruc-
ture, exchange of technology and expertise and tariff liberalizations are all processes benefitting all 
implicated actors (Rothberg 2008: 33). We argue this is an indication of how China is seeking to 
implement a new track in the interstate system.  
The institutionalization of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation  
In 2000 the intensification of the Sino-African relations led to the founding of the Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). FOCAC is a forum of African countries and China in order to dis-
cuss and form policies for further economic cooperation and political agreements. The first FOCAC 
conference was held in Beijing in October 2000, with more than 80 Chinese participating ministers 
and 44 African representatives of 17 regional and international organizations. Furthermore there 
was a range of representatives from the business communities of China and Africa (FOCAC, 17-12-
2013). At this conference, China encouraged African countries to deny financial aid from Western 
countries, if it was associated with demands of interventionist political reforms (Taylor 2006: 68). 
The statements from the early 1990’s indicate how China s exercises influence in the interstate sys-
tem by institutionalizing the Sino-African relations, which have intensified the volume and dynamic 
density of the system. In relation to Modern World Theory, institutionalizations of increasing rela-
tions are unavoidable and can pose as possible competition to the existing structure of the interstate 
system. FOCAC therefore represents a possible threat to US hegemony and results in an increase of 
the intensity of the interstate system. It is an indirect way to delegitimize the status of the declining 
hegemon by creating a new dimension in the interstate system. In 2006, FOCAC included 48 Afri-
can countries, thereby bolstering its regional and global value (FOCAC, 17-12-2013). As of now, 
there has been five conferences concerned about the development of the Sino-African relations in 
different spheres of cooperation, such as exchange of experts and technology and exchanges of edu-
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cation (Rothberg 2008: xx). The frequency of state visits has increased in the last two decades in 
relation to the increasing Sino-African relationship. It should be noted the frequency of state visits 
in Sino-African auspice are unprecedented by any other country with relations to Africa (Barton et 
al. 2011: 8).   
According to the Arrighi, the intensified participation, the development of FOCAC and increase of 
official state visits increase the relevancy of FOCAC. While it does not directly hamper Western 
influence in Africa, it does serve to mark Chinese interest in Africa. Furthermore, FOCAC supports 
the trend of China acquiring the necessary systematic capabilities required for its growing political 
influence. In relation to Arrighi, the establishment of institutions such as FOCAC reveals the emer-
gence of new configurations of the interstate system. Furthermore, as the Sino-African relationship 
deepens, African countries will likely emulate China in a higher degree than they are doing at the 
moment. 
Sub-conclusion 
The backing of China in the emergence of the South-South cooperation and especially the role of 
Africa has been one of several developments increasing the rivalry within the interstate system. 
This has been evident in the African support of China in the aftermath of June 4th Incident in 1989, 
as China was ‘only’ faced with condemnations from Western countries, partly because of the Afri-
can support. The increase of economic cooperation and investments bring forth political commit-
ments, deepening relations and support in matters of international politics. We argue the demand 
and need for development in African countries pose a systematic problem that requires systematic 
solutions due to its scale and necessity. As China is engaging in such an endeavor, they are not only 
consolidating their political relations but also addressing a systematic problem of the interstate sys-
tem. This is supported by African states indicate the development assistance and restraints offered 
by the US and the West are not favorable to their development. However China and the Beijing 
consensus appear to be more favorable to the African countries. We therefore argue there is a rise of 
bifurcation of alternative solutions to the same systematic problem, which is only present at the 
same time of systematic chaos. The alternative approach offered by China and Beijing Consensus is 
an indication towards African countries’ current choice for the Beijing Consensus as well as Chi-
nese partnership. We therefore argue in terms of the African countries’ preference, that China 
through its Beijing Consensus offers a better systematic solution for the systematic problem than 
the US. 
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As we have uncovered in our analysis regarding the increased political influence of China, it has 
been increasingly engaged in bilateral agreements and regional organizations through the applica-
tion of “The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence” as part of the Beijing Consensus. We there-
fore argue for a verification of the research hypothesis: 
Through the application of Zhou Enlai’s “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence”, bilateral 
agreements and regional organisations, China is practicing an alternative approach to internation-
al relations and other countries.  
Analysis of China’s increasing commitment to the SLOC’s  
In this chapter we will analyze the increase in Chinese military capabilities as an intertwined pattern 
to the economic expansion and political prestige. This section will therefore look into the Chinese 
engagements in regional stability of Africa regarding their Maritime Cooperation to help prevent 
piracy in the Gulf of Aden. We will assess China’s military commitment to protection of the Sea 
Lines of Communications while correlating these developments with the trends of systematic lead-
ership and natural developments of security. Lastly we will assess our research hypothesis in terms 
of a verification or falsification. 
Maritime security as a systematic problem and its relevance for China  
Modern piracy has flourished within the last two decades. Between the time periods from 2005 to 
2010 alone, the international society saw attacks worldwide on commercial and private ships alike, 
and the frequency has increased substantially every year. According to a report citing EU naval of-
ficials, the number of pirate attacks rose threefold in 2010 (Erickson, 2013: 9; CNN, 17-12-2013). 
The reported international pirate attacks peaked at 445 in 2010, as 275 of these occurred off the 
coast of Somalia near international trade routes referred to as Sea Lines of Communication 
(SLOCs). This is evident due to the fact, that in 2010 the attacks off the coast of Somalia had the 
highest success rate of any region plague by piracy, as well as accounting of 90 % of total ship sei-
zures worldwide (Erickson, 2013: 9).  
In 2012, an article in the newspaper of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) stated, that the 
Gulf of Aden covers roughly 530,000 square kilometers, creating a large area of operation and di-
rect access to SLOCs (Erickson, 2013: 9). The Gulf of Aden is one of several choke points of inter-
national shipping. Nearly 20 000 ships transport roughly 12% of the world’s global commerce 
,including 30% of the world’s raw oil, making it the perfect target for international piracy (Annex 1; 
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annex 2; Erickson et al., 2013: 9, Barton et al., 2011: 85). A recent study of these disruptions sug-
gests the costs to be between 7 and 12 billion US$ annually (Erickson et al. 2013: 11). A substantial 
part of the world’s SLOC’s, including the Bab el Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, the Indian Ocean, 
the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Singapore and the South China Sea, are facing the increasing 
destabilizing effects of piracy (Ibid.: 11). First, approximately half of the world’s container ship-
ments pass through the Bab el Mandeb connecting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Second, about 
40 % of the world’s global energy shipments pass through the Strait of Hormuz which is in close 
proximity to other nearby areas affected by piracy (Ibid.: 12). Though most pirate attacks are still 
somewhat limited, even a temporary disruption in any of the mentioned regions with their im-
portance for the global market could have profound consequences. If such a threat would go unchal-
lenged and forcing companies to delay critical supplies of resources and energy, the impact of such 
disruptions could be significant.  
The risks to global commerce in and around the Gulf of Aden are portrayed how Australia in 2012 
decided to reroute the heavy-lift ship Blue Marlin carrying HMAS Canberra.5  HMAS Canberra 
was transported from facilities in Spain to Geeling in Australia, around the Cape of Good Hope, 
instead of sailing through the Gulf of Aden (Erickson et al. 2013: 10). This decision was made due 
to the ship’s risk of being hijacked by pirates, and would entail a major setback for all parties in-
volved in the development of the HMAS Canberra. Furthermore, it would give the pirates in form 
of a major asset. The detour in itself resulted in a delayed transport time of about six weeks (Ibid.: 
10). 
The emergence of China as next cashbox of the system and their dependency on commerce and the 
global market poses somewhat more complex challenges for the continued growth of China’s econ-
omy. China is becoming increasingly reliant on SLOC security for its economic growth and energy 
supply, thus securing SLOCs is critical for safeguarding future energy supplies (Erickson et al., 
2013: 13). Therefore, if there are to be disruptions of trade by pirates in the Gulf of Aden and the 
Indian Ocean, it would threaten the movement of both the global supply of oil and commodities on 
which China is heavily dependent on whereas about 40 % of Chinas oil import is delivered by sea 
(Ibid.: 13,16). Pirates pose a serious threat to economic and political stability of states that are en-
gaged and dependent on the global market and SLOCs (Erickson et al. 2013: 11, Kamerling et al. 
                                                 
5 Canberra is an amphibious assault ship and is larger than an aircraft carrier, and which will be the largest ship 
in the Australian Navy (Erickson et al. 2013: 10).  
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2011: 121). China has lately become increasingly committed to the protection of the SLOCs as a 
result of piracy being a systematic problem. 
China: Illuminating systematic leadership 
China’s increasing economic and political relationship with African states have been accompanied 
by a relative small but significant military expansion in relation to addressing piracy as a systematic 
problem. This correlates with the Modern World Theory as a hegemon often expands its sphere of 
interest due to its increased demand of resources, as well as the need for integration and expansion 
of new markets to feed its escalating exports. Thus, when a hegemon expands its economic and po-
litical interest, they will be followed by military expansions to protect its economic and political 
interests.  
As China deepens its relationship with Africa, its crucial importance to the continued growth of 
China becomes more apparent. The military effort in the affected SLOCs are still somewhat limited, 
but it is necessary to keep in mind the partaking of securing the SLOC’s is now part of China’s stra-
tegic goals and PLAN. China has been contributing to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa serving 
its national interest in Africa. This has done much to secure the internal stability of especially Sub-
Saharan countries. However while China mostly has sent non-combatant troops as part of UN 
peacekeeping missions, the Chinese initiative in the Gulf of Aden is marking a shift of focus (Ibid.: 
120).  
”[This] Will be the first overseas deployment for Chinese maritime forces 
since the fifteenth century” (Barton et al. 2011: 81) 
The military expansion is determined by a different approach of a more active foreign policy with 
the operationalizing of two destroyers and a supply ship. The naval capacity is planned to be ex-
panded as part of the solution to piracy (Barton et al. 2011 81). This is not just an ordinary expres-
sion of China seeking to secure their own national interests, but also those of the system, crediting 
China as international stakeholders.  
“Warships are mobile national territory; the escort task force is a name card for Chi-
na’s image. While carrying out escorts in the Gulf of Aden, we not only need to guar-
antee the safety of escorted ships, but need even more to display the elegance of the 
Chinese navy, [and thereby] display an image of China being a responsible power.” 
(Erickson et al. 2013: 18).  
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The emergence of the military developments is non-traditional commitments in Chinese history, as 
this is their first manifestation of military aspirations in the interstate system as an indicator for a 
new track being implemented. This is further underlined by the fact China does not have a history 
of commitment to global security. At first, this engagement was completed independently from in-
ternational cooperation, therefore without participating in the International Recommended Transit 
Corridor (IRTC), which was established in early 2009 (Kamerling et al. 2011: 122-123). This corri-
dor ran through the Gulf of Aden, which was patrolled by the EU (by EU NAVFOR Mission Ata-
lanta), NATO (by Mission Ocean Shield) and the US led Task Force 151 (CTF-151). This meant 
China unofficially took charge of protecting Chinese transport, but as time progressed and Chinas 
engagement deepened, it has gained a foothold in IRTC and was accepted in early 2010 (Ibid.: 123). 
As stated before, the PLAN’s presence in the Gulf of Aden and other SLOCs were small, but it 
credited China as one of the responsible powers in matters of global security. Furthermore, this de-
ployment which involves some of China’s most advanced modern warships, allowed China to par-
ticipate in several multinational initiatives in IRTC. One of the most important initiatives is the 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) as it includes every representative from 
states and organizations participating in the region. This means, China now operates and coordi-
nates their activities in the Gulf of Aden with other navies, in what President Hu Jintao has termed 
The Harmonious Ocean. Furthermore, the commander of PLAN Wu Shengli comments on the 
counter-piracy cooperation as a good example on the subject (Ibid.: 123). 
Besides the military benefits PLAN achieves from its overseas antipiracy operation, it also allowed 
China to further consolidate its interests in the surrounding oceans and gain a preliminary foothold 
for future operations and maritime expansions in the Indian Ocean (Erickson et al., 2013: 30). The 
antipiracy operation has meant a more stable transit in the Indian Ocean and military and commer-
cial ships alike have visited nearby harbors frequently. Alongside the several newly established 
Chinese ports following the SLOCs which have been termed the String of Pearls (Ibid.: 30). The 
implementation of the strategy has established several military and trade ports along the SLOCs. 
This has undoubtedly led to tensions and increasing rivalry between China and the US in regional 
security, since the states that China have conducted agreements with, are close to neighboring mili-
tary allies of the US (Arrighi 2007: 7). The states which conducted agreements with China are My-
anmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, Pakistan, Seychelles and Mauritius (Barton et al. 2011: 
89).   
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If China is to be recognized and accepted as a global actor within spheres of security in the inter-
state system, they need to be able to create new institutions across the system. First, they need to be 
to integrated and influence the existing structures of security already functional in the interstate sys-
tem. According to the Modern World Theory, they need to be able to protect their interests as well 
as general interests of the interstate system. Historically, the British Empire has been protecting 
their overseas colonies by supremacy in both their navy and army. However, this is not possible 
today in the same respect due to international law and institutions, which an emerging hegemon 
must integrate. Yet the tendency we are seeing is matter of protecting China’s own national interests 
just as previous hegemons has done before. China is becoming ever more evident in international 
matters of maritime security. The general tendency is not only has China created the necessary ca-
pabilities of finance, but there is also an increasing Chinese buildup of the necessary capabilities in 
matters of security and especially maritime security.  
Sub-conclusion: Chinese military capabilities as a tendency towards regional governance  
According to the Modern World Theory there is a need for protection of SLOCs just as there have 
been in previous hegemonies. In this regard, we argue the matter of security in the chokepoints and 
especially the Gulf of Aden is a system problem demanding system solutions. This problem has 
been approached by several states, as there would be in a time of bifurcation. Yet it is precisely the 
engagements of China and its revolutionary break with traditional conservative foreign policy, 
which show signs of China becoming a responsible stakeholder. In terms of military capabilities, 
the expansion to effectively manage blue sea operations indicates China is able to contribute to the 
successful decline in pirate attacks in the region in cooperation with international navies. This con-
stitutes a part of the increasing interstate rivalry aimed at the US supremacy in the sphere of securi-
ty in the region. The challenge to the US is an indication of an emerging rival in the sphere of influ-
ence by the declining hegemon. The military aspect of engaging piracy will increase the volume and 
density of the interstate system.  
We have argued, China’s commitment to the protection of the SLOC’s China is depending on, is 
part of the emergence of China as a global hegemon. This analysis needs to be seen in conjunction 
with the general increase in military capabilities. The analysis verifies our research hypothesis that 
states:  
China’s increased commitment to protection of the Sea Lines of Communication in the bay of Aden 
is part of the increase in China’s military capabilities and emergence as a new hegemon. 
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Summary of the conclusions on the analysis 
As we have demonstrated in our analysis, China’s emergence as a hegemon is closely connected to 
the economic-political development in Africa. This has led to an institutionalization of the Sino-
African relationship in the foundation of FOCAC as the most prestigious political project of the 
relationship. Furthermore, Africa and China are increasingly becoming more economic dependent 
on each other, but there is an unequal distribution of the imported and exported goods from China. 
Furthermore the general economic-political development has also led to an increase in China’s mili-
tary capabilities as evident in the commitment of the PLAN in the IRTC in the Indian Ocean and 
Gulf of Aden. In general, our research hypotheses have been verified in the light of our analysis and 
we have established growing recognition of the emergence of China as a hegemon.  
But the question still remains whether China is preparing to challenge US hegemony or is in the 
process of active challenging it. While our analysis clearly indicates China is growing in influence 
in economic, political and military aspects, it does not indicate if we are facing a decisive hegemon-
ic breakdown or simply a crisis. The following discussion of our analysis will focus on and assess 
the current state of our hegemonic cycle.  
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A matter of bifurcation 
As evident in previous chapters, we argue the current situation of the interstate system is one of 
bifurcation. This means US hegemony no longer possess the power to lead the system and is either 
using force or threat of force when diplomacy is no longer an option. This has led to tendencies of 
chaos, such as a condition of bifurcation. This condition leads to multiple solutions to systematic 
problems which is perceived to be countries’ independent actions towards solving these. The fol-
lowing sections will therefore discuss whether or not we can perceive the trends as being one of 
bifurcation and their correlation to the theory as well as its relation to the overall pattern of hege-
monic transition.  
China - Becoming a responsible stakeholder of maritime security 
Following the centuries of Western maritime dominance that dates back to that of Columbus, China 
is taking concrete steps to develop its maritime reach beyond that of Chinese periphery. Chinas rise 
and maritime ambitions in nearby and foreign seas pose complex challenges and opportunities for 
the US, both globally and in the East-Asian Theater.  
The recent upsurge of piracy and the response of the interstate system as well as the variety of dif-
ferent actors involved, serve both as an indication of the necessity of securing SLOCs and the con-
dition of bifurcation. In all cases of hegemony, the control and security over SLOCs were the source 
of an overabundant mobile capital and whoever controlled it, was in control of one of the most im-
portant sources of acquiring a competitive edge. Therefore arguing the case the security of global 
commerce through SLOCs is a systematic problem.  
This has been addressed by China’s “String of Pearls” strategy, which has been initiated to support 
the Chinese engagement in combatting piracy in and around the different chokepoints of SLOCs. 
This endeavor by China to diminish the threat of piracy could also potentially pose the US with 
complex regional challenges, as the building of ports contain both military and air facilities, which 
is not only enhancing Chinas presence along the SLOCs, but also establishing strategic relation-
ships in former US dominated seas. One example is how China has initiated a project with Pakistan 
in the construction of a port in Gwadar. A port in Gwadar would be less likely to be blockaded as 
Karachi was in the India-Pakistan war of 1971 and threatened again during the Kargil conflict of 
1999, thus further away from US’ radius of action (Pehrson, 2006: 3). The incentive and strategic 
goal of construction such a port would be to better engage in conflicts around the Strait of Hormuz 
which will help combatting the matter of pirates. The project also serves to enhance the strategic, 
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diplomatic and economic ties between China and Pakistan, facilitate trade routes from the Middle 
East and indicate a challenge to US dominance in the Indian Ocean. In recent developments the port 
has had its depth dredged further to allow aircraft carriers and submarines to dock and resupply. In 
this regards it would seem probable that this development have been made as to benefit the new 
Chinese aircraft carrier, the Liainong (O’Rourke, 2013: 44, Erickson et al. 2013: 82).  
The emphasis of the String of Pearls Strategy have been defined to SLOCs in relation to trade to 
Africa and the Middle East, but also other countries of a different regional position, have benefitted 
from the strategy as well. For example, China made agreements with Cambodia to provide military 
equipment and training in 2003, in exchange for the right to build railway from a southern China to 
Thailand and the Philippines, increasing their strategic reach and implement deeper ties with sur-
rounding countries (Pehrson 2006: 4). Another argument to further support the Chinese expansion 
of PLAN and their ambition towards maritime leadership, is their increasing spending on the de-
fense budget and the increase of naval capabilities in the last two decades. According to the tables 
in annex 5 and 6 China has increased their naval capabilities quite rapidly in the last two decades. 
This is noted in their rapid development of units such as frigates, destroyers, and the projected val-
ues does nothing to indicate slowing such a progress and their further deployment (Erickson et al. 
2013: 82). However, as the tables also indicate, many of these units are of older class and even if 
they are of modern quality, the Chinese administration still lacks expertise on maritime administra-
tion and expertise (O’Rourke 2013: 45).  
If this is not addressed by the US, as they have several alliance commitments in the region, they will 
lose influence and political goodwill, which they simply cannot afford to lose due to the progression 
of China’s maritime ambitions. To be fair, the US Navy blue water capabilities provide the US with 
substantial hard power in regional security, which has been demonstrated several times (Pehrson 
2006: 21). Other components to US influence in the region, is the forward presence of US ground 
and air forces, as well as the overwhelming defense budget of the US. In comparison to China and 
the rest of the world, the US expenditure on the defense budget is huge as indicated in annex 5. Yet 
their influence in the region have experienced new policies, resulting in a decrease of stationed 
forces (Pehrson 2006: 21). However, the absence of Obama in the last APEC meeting was noted, 
and China was quick to capitalize on the occasion and indicating they are aspiring for leadership in 
the region (The New York Times c, 17-12-2013). The recent dispute over China’s Air Defense 
Identification Zone (ADIZ) might further validate the interstate rivalry which is evident in men-
tioned seas, and especially the East China Sea (The Economist b, 17-12-2013). As of now the con-
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flicts have been non-violent in nature and violent acts may not be necessary, but this dispute could 
quite possibly have created a potential casus belli.  
These examples and the findings in our analyses indicate the scope and scale of Chinese ambition 
following the String of Pearls. This is manifested in China increasing their maritime capabilities, 
influencing existing institutions and portraying to partake in a systematic solution, thus experienc-
ing a power inflation. However, if China is not able to sustain their economic growth, which these 
initiatives are aimed to prevent, it could deter its political ambitions. Nevertheless it is worth ac-
knowledging the commitment of China is the first of its kind, and follows the patterns of previous 
hegemonies and this development is somewhat rapid in relation to the short historical duration of 
China’s maritime engagements. Furthermore, the relative quick inclusion of China into the existing 
organization within the field of maritime security in the region is a step towards acquiring the nec-
essary capabilities needed for maritime capabilities in the interstate system.  
Beijing the new cashbox of the interstate system 
The increase of economic relations of the past two decades of Sino-African relations and the finan-
cial expansion is an argument correlating with the global tendencies and establishing Beijing as the 
cashbox of the interstate system. According to Arrighi, the relocation of cash flows and the emer-
gence of cashboxes are only visible when the condition of bifurcation emerges, which is truly evi-
dent in the current condition of the interstate system.  
China has over the last two decades managed to make a vast accumulation of capital, due to their 
emulation of Western financial systems and modes of production. However, in contrast to states 
such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, China has been able to do so in a much greater scale. 
Furthermore, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore are also incorporated in alliances with the US and 
does not present as great a threat as China does to the existing system (Arrighi et al. 1999: 18). The 
implications of China’s vast accumulation of capital from the US and the interstate system could 
quite possibly be related to the US accumulation of capital at the expense of Great Britain during 
the two world wars. We argue China should be seen as accumulating capital at the expense of the 
United States due to their involvement in the Middle East. As of now China, has a dollar reserve of 
3.66 trillion dollars (Arrighi 2007: 6, Bloomberg, 17-12-2013), which is the greatest in the world 
economy, making them able to influence the interstate system in matters of finance. This should 
also be seen in the light of the US having amassed the single largest debt in the world. Thus has led 
to a change of capital flows and thus change the world’s financial center to East Asia, which might 
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eventually move towards China (Reuters, 17-12-2013). Nevertheless, the competition and the 
change of cash flows in East Asia led by China is evident. China, and several other states to a cer-
tain degree, can provide larger and more profitable loans than the Western dominated organizations 
such as IMF (Arrighi 2007: 385). This will eventually lead to IMF losing their influence, as devel-
oping countries are now acquiring loans from China in place of IMF. Furthermore it leaves IMF in 
economic difficulties and undermining their authority, which also means an undermining of the US-
dominated capitalistic system (Arrighi et al. 1999: 383).  
Besides tendencies referring to China as being the new cashbox of the interstate system, there is 
also certain processes indicate how China will continue its future development as the new entrépot 
of the interstate system. China has due to their relative large accumulation of capital managed to 
create such supply, which in turn is becoming an object of competition in the interstate system. We 
argue this development is being directed towards Africa because China’s material needs and Afri-
can willingness to export and hunger for FDI. We have argued the increasing Sino-African relations 
are undergoing big intensifications in terms of bilateral trade and OFDI. Furthermore, we argue the 
implementation of the financial expansion of China’s should be considered as a new track of devel-
opment assistance with the basis of the “Five Principles for Co-Existence”.  
Though why is Chinas development assistance proving to be more profitable than the US led west-
ern approach? The combination of China’s foreign policy and the increasing relations of Sino-
African ties can be explained by how Chinese SOE’s are less risk-averse and more flexible because 
of the Beijing Consensus. This indicates China’s foreign policy enables Chinese firms and state 
OFDI of being less apprehensive to engage in war torn states such as Angola, DR Congo and Sierra 
Leone, where arrangements of Chinese SOEs and OFDI might play out in their favor. China are 
thus able to implement their operations in political and economic environments, which Western 
businesses would consider as unstable, potentially making China the dominant actor in such envi-
ronment. It is on the willingness of Chinese SOEs, Chinese firms are able to deduct the big profits 
from rates of return on foreign direct investments. It is necessary keep in mind the governmental 
benefits accompanying Chinese businesses with such deployments in Africa. China’s engagement 
in Africa is drastically increasing, as in 2006 there were more than ten times Chinese entrepreneurs 
as in 2003, in countries where US and Western businesses were absent (Arrighi 2007: 207).  
China has been able to commit in countries in need of different kinds of investments and at the 
same time secure their own supply of energy to sustain their economic development. This tendency 
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of facilitating foreign markets, great infrastructure projects such as special economic zones (SEZs) 
and increasing the bilateral trade are quite similar to the economic pattern of US hegemony (Roth-
berg 2008: 137). It is necessary to keep in mind that after WWII, the US had high production capa-
bilities and a devastated Europe to potentially consume its goods. Thus, they needed to develop 
European markets in order create efficient relations of commerce and mutual development. We ar-
gue the recent development of Sino-African relations should be seen in the light of the historic de-
velopment of the US after WWII. The pattern is similar, as China due to its development of African 
states through Chinese firms and OFDI gain access to these markets and secure their economic 
growth not only of energy and raw materials, but also exports of commodities. However it is not 
just in Africa this tendency is observable. Another example is in South Asia, where trade with India 
has developed from 300 million US$ in 1995 to 20 billion US$ in 2005, indicating a clear intensifi-
cation in international relations between China and India (Arrighi 2007: 207). However this rela-
tionship is not entirely on par with Chinas trade with Africa, which progressed from just short of 10 
billion US$ to 40 billion US$ from 2000 to 2005 (Ibid.: 207). Another development is the official 
state visits by Hu Jintao in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba while announcing more than 30 bil-
lion US$ in OFDI and long term contracts, guaranteeing China supplies of raw materials, indicating 
China is encroaching on a traditional US sphere of interest (Ibid.: 207).  
An example of increasing interstate rivalry between the US and China and increase in systematic 
density and volume, is evident in China National Offshore Oil Company’s (CNOOC) attempt to 
buy US oil company Unilocal (Arrighi 2007: 278). Even though it was already sold, there was a 
vote of whether or not it should be sold to China, with a staggering 398-to-15 nay-vote. This was 
further emphasized with the statement if China bought Unilocal it would “Threaten to impair the 
national security of the United States” (Ibid.: 278). If China had bought the company it would have 
given them wider control over energy resources they needed and pose another of several challenges 
to US hegemony. The economic challenge is clear in this regard and it is already leading to an esca-
lation of interstate rivalry between the US and China, based on the increased interstate competition.  
China’s alternative development assistance and the Beijing consensus as a step towards sys-
tematic governance  
China is approaching African countries with an alternative development model and different princi-
ples, which situates African countries without the conditions that would accompany the Washington 
Consensus. Some of the Chinese investments are not only directed towards economic gains but po-
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litical. Since most infrastructure projects are directed in public sectors, China conceives this as pro-
jects of goodwill to gain influence with African leaders (Tull 2006: 468). This will enable China to 
open doors to commercial or strategic attractive businesses in other sectors, such as win access to 
oil and mining operations. However, some of these investments in African countries are not always 
of mutual benefit. China has often been subject to criticism by the US and Western countries for 
capitalizing on much needed investments in several sectors with gains of resources in mind to fur-
ther their own development (Barton et al. 2011: 67). However, the slow emulation of the Beijing 
Consensus by African states indicate a change of tracks towards new modes of production, com-
merce and finance, indicating China as a tracklaying vehicle. Yet in order for this new position of 
tracklaying can be consolidated, China needs to ascertain itself as a regional leader and a contester 
for global leadership. To become a hegemon and obtain leadership, it needs the approval of the in-
terstate system in terms of acknowledging it as the general interest of the system. Even though the 
relations between Africa and China has been institutionalized and is a major development in Sino-
African relations. The matter of the general acceptance of Chinese tracklaying with a basis in the 
“Five Principles of Coexistence” and the following Beijing Consensus however still remains to be 
seen.  
The relations between Africa and China date back to the 1950’, yet the cooperation between Latin 
America and China is relatively new. Up and until the 1980’s the US was Latin America’s biggest 
trading partner, when EU replaced the US in the 1990’s. The emergence of Asia and in particular 
China has the potential to become the next big influence in Latin America (OECD, 17-12-2013). 
The relations between China and Africa became institutionalized in 2000 due to the escalating de-
pendency and meant the establishment of FOCAC. This trend has also been seen in China’s rela-
tions with Latin America and the Caribbean through the establishment of the first China-Latin 
American and the Caribbean Forum of Ministers of Agriculture and the start of negotiations about a 
China-Latin America Cooperation Forum (Voxxi, 17-12-2013). The deputy of the Economic Com-
mission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), stated: 
“In the agricultural sector, there are real complementarities between China and Latin 
America and the Caribbean that can be used to build a strategic trade, technology 
and cultural relationship with mutual benefits (OECD, 17-12-2013).”  
Over course of six years, China has become one of the principle manufacturing suppliers in the re-
gion and are inciting Latin American leaders by offering a financial package of $5 billion to pro-
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mote cooperation with local manufacturing industries. Furthermore the China Development Bank 
offers $10 billion to create the same kind of infrastructure projects of road, railroads, ports and 
more, just as they have been offering African countries earlier (Voxxi, 17-12-2013). By institution-
alizing such relations and the increase of bilateral trade it will truly create the fundamental pillars in 
a South-South cooperation, thus intensifying the interstate rivalries within the interstate system. 
These developments in Africa, Latin-America and South Asia are likely to lead the burst of the cur-
rent interstate system dominated by the US.  
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Conclusion – Will China progress along the lines of hegemony?  
Problem statement 
How does the economic, political and military engagement in Africa support China’s development 
into a great power on the world scene and what does this imply in relations to the existing world 
order dominated by the US and the West? 
The overall pattern of hegemonic transition is still influenced by the terminal crisis of the New 
American Century project initiated by the Bush Administration, yet the imminent decline indicated 
by Arrighi and Wallerstein, the effects of the financial crisis has not crippled the American hegem-
ony as fast as predicted. The present hegemonic crisis is still at an early stage of development and 
influenced by a steady increase of interstate rivalry and increases of volume and density of the sys-
tem with the new initiatives by China. However, the tendencies we have analyzed towards a hege-
monic breakdown are few and whether and when such a breakdown actually might occur still re-
mains an open question. We do know however, that the present hegemony is influenced by a condi-
tion of bifurcation due to a process of fission and not fusion of military, political and financial pow-
er. Though the aspiration of military capabilities of China is indicating progress towards such 
claims, they are still not on par with the military capabilities of the US, even if their military capa-
bilities have experienced a matter of uncertainty in relation to their effectiveness. The continuation 
of US defense expenditure means, the global control over means of violence has become ever more 
concentrated in the declining hegemon, and not spread throughout the actors of the interstate sys-
tem. However, the control over universal accepted means of payment is becoming increasingly con-
centrated in the hands of Asian countries with China as the main actor. This indicates the traditional 
Euro-American power of centers of the Modern World System is moving towards Asia with China 
as the dominant actor. But the question of leadership and the integration a new track in the interstate 
system is still questionable and somewhat mixed. The “Five Principles of Co-Existence” combined 
with China’s alternative development assistance gives them the opportunity to establish strong 
commerce with countries not considered by the dominating agency, and these countries are at some 
degree adopting the Beijing Consensus as their model of development. China is thus straining the 
interstate system due to its disregard of international law of human rights. This makes it hard for 
China to take a more predominant position in the interstate system and more so claim leadership 
due to initial resistance within the interstate system.  
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Nevertheless, China is already an important actor in geopolitics in spheres of both economic and 
political, and will eventually as well in the military sphere. China’s continuation of impressive 
growth, their vast economy as well as diplomatic support from several developing countries make it 
almost certain, China will continue to consolidate its hegemonic aspirations. If the tendencies con-
tinue in areas such as deeper relations in Africa, deeper expansions in developing regions such as 
Latin America, increasing Chinese political commitment in international institutions and further 
consolidation of their own position, China will continue to rise. We believe this will lead to either a 
confrontation or a peaceful transition between the US and China. However, whether or not there is 
an end to the ongoing systematic crisis and if China will emerge as the new hegemon is still open to 
debate.  
  
74 
 
Epilogue  
When writing our project we have encountered several difficulties in both identifying our objects of 
analysis, how to engage with those we did and disputes between our philosophy of science and our 
theory as well as the validity of the conclusion itself.  
The theory assumes a certain framework that includes different processes that explains how hege-
monic transitions exists within the interstate system, yet this framework is largely dependent on 
abstract objects and are not always explained in detail. This enabled us independently to explore the 
specific processes that we found relevant to research. We believe the way we have applied Modern 
World Theory is true to its core of intentions. Defining the abstract processes of the theory to the 
specific factors of our empirical data does involve a risk of improper prioritization of the value of 
the concepts. However, this has not been our main concern. According to Modern World Theory’s 
dependency on Wallerstein’s hegemonic cycle, the theory assumes a certain ontological feature. As 
Wallerstein operates within behavioralism, which acknowledges law-like tendencies, the applica-
tion of Modern World Theory in a critical realist framework does have a slight weakness. The ele-
ment of behavioralism in the project thus comes across as certain processes that are repeatable, re-
sembling the notion of possible law-like tendencies in IR-tradition. With the added perspective of 
enabling and constraining structures, the actors in the interstate system can approach the same sys-
tematic problem in different ways. 
We acknowledge that our project gives but a short insight into Chinese foreign policy and actions, 
and there are possibly certain areas that would prove differently. The current tendencies we have 
uncovered might also be portrayed differently by using a different theoretical perspective to Modern 
World Theory. Our research would thus benefit from a micro-level perspective in the notion of he-
gemony in order to supplement our macro-level research.  
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Annex 3: 
 
2 Annex 3: Development of China’s total and Sino-African trade in millions US$. Source: tralac (2013) 
 
Annex 4: 
 
3 Annex 4: Percentage of increase in Sino-African trade and China's total trade from 1995-2012. Source: tralac (2013) 
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Annex 5: Numbers of PLA Navy Ships Provided by ONI in 2013.  
This table shows figures provided by Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in 2013 on numbers of 
Chinese Navy ships in 2000, 2005 and 2010, and projected figures for 2015 and 2020, along with 
the approximate percentage of ships within these figures considered bu INO to be of modern design 
O’Rourke, Ronald (2013), China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – 
Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress – Prepared for Members and 
Committees of Congress. Congressional Research Service.  
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Annex 6: Numbers of PLA Navy Ships and Aircraft Provided by ONI in 2009 
This table shows figures provided by the ONI in 2009 on numbers of Chinese navy ships and air-
craft from 1990 to 2009, and projected figures for 2015 and 2020. This table consists of both older 
and less capable units and never and more capable units.  
O’Rourke, Ronald (2013), China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – 
Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress – Prepared for Members and 
Committees of Congress. Congressional Research Service.  
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Annex 7: Military Spending 2012 Billion US$ 
This graph shows how the military spending of the most dominant states are portrayed in relation to 
each other in billion US$.  
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2013/04/daily-chart-9, The Economist, Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute. Last reviewed 17-12-2013.  
 
  
